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                                              ABSTRACT 
The People‟s Republic of China first developed an interest in Africa during the late 
1950‟s, a few years after the end of the Chinese civil war. Chinese interests in Africa 
occurred at a time when the Communist regime led by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung was 
facing serious threats from the United States of America (US) and its allies. As such, the 
objective of China‟s policy on Africa at the time was to seek the support of African 
countries in a bid to resist isolation from the US and its allies as well as to foster 
revolutions in Africa aimed at depriving the West of African‟s raw materials and access 
to African markets.  
 
During the 1970‟s, China‟s policy on Africa changed significantly as the result of China‟s 
admission into the UN and the relative success achieved by  that country in getting 
recognition from African countries. Consequently, China‟s policy on Africa became less 
aggressive toward the West. During the 1980‟s, the normalisation of China‟s relations 
with the US as well as the arrival of new leadership in China, prompted the country to 
adopt a foreign policy centred on economic development. As such, Africa became less 
important for China. 
 
Over the last two decades China has achieved a robust economic growth that averaged 
9.5%. In order to sustain its formidable economic growth, China needs access to raw 
materials, notably oil and minerals. Therefore, in the beginning of this new century China 
renewed its interest in Africa. Nevertheless, compared to the 1950‟s when China‟s 
interest in Africa was mainly driven by ideological factors, the current strong Chinese 
interest in Africa is driven by economic factors, namely, access to African oil and 
minerals.   
 
This study investigates the partnership between China and Angola, with a particular 
interest on the impact of trade between China and Angola and Chinese investments on the 
Angolan economy as well as on the Angolan population. Concerning Chinese 
investments in Angola, this study focuses on the Angolan construction sector.  
 6 
This study attempts to gauge whether Chinese involvement in Angola is a positive factor 
for the country‟s economic development given the fact that Chinese involvement in 
Angola is not altruistic. 
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 CHAPTER 1: WHY INVESTIGATE CHINA‟S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important developments in the beginning of the twenty- first century has 
surely been the progressive emergence of China as a world power. Actually, the market 
based economic reforms initiated by Chinese former president Teng Hsiao-P‟ing (Deng 
Xiaoping) upon his rise to power in 1978 have triggered positive effects in the last two to 
three decades. Indeed, Chinese economic growth has averaged 9.5% annually over the 
past two decades. Between 1980 and 2000, Chinese GDP rose from Rmb 451.8 billion to 
Rmb 8,946.8 trillion, an increase of 1880.2%.
1
 In addition to that, during the same period, 
real per capita income rose by more than 400%.
2
 As a result, in 2006 China became the 
world‟s fourth largest economy, surpassing France and Britain.3 This formidable 
economic growth saw the number of people living in extreme poverty in China decline by 
220 million between 1978 and 1999.
4
 
 
Despite this strong economic growth, China is still a developing country, since there are 
as many as 200 million unemployed or underemployed people in the countryside.
5
 
Moreover, the number of Chinese living below the poverty line (less than one dollar a 
day) was estimated between 120 to 130 million in 2006.
6
Given that poverty and 
unemployment are still rampant in China, the main priority for the Chinese leadership is 
to maintain the robust economic growth at least over the next two decades in a bid to 
drastically reduce poverty and unemployment in China.
7
In order to maintain its robust 
economic growth, China desperately needs access not only to raw materials such as oil 
and minerals but also to markets for its manufactured goods.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2004. 
2
 Sally Razeen. China‟s Trade Policies and its Integration into the World Economy. P26 
3
 Pei Minxin. The Dark Side of China‟s Rise. 
4
 Sally Razeen. Op.cit.P28 
5
 Ibid.P28 
6
 Xinhua. Official: China‟s poverty too low. 
7
 Shelton Garth. Post – Jiang China: Challenges for a New Leadership. P83 
 8 
However, given the limited amount of oil and some raw materials in China, coupled with 
the sustained robust economic growth, the country has to import some minerals and oil 
from foreign countries. Actually, China has become a net importer of crude oil since 
1993, and since then it has been increasingly dependent on foreign oil imports.
8
  China 
currently consumes 6 534 000 barrels of crude oil per day while it locally produces 
approximately 4 000 000 barrels of crude oil per day.
9
In addition, China has also become 
dependent on foreign supply of minerals to sustain its economic growth. China consumes 
22% of world copper output, 21% of world aluminum production, 35% of global coal 
production and 20% of magnesium production.
10
 
 
As a result of China‟s high demand for raw materials coupled with the need to find 
markets, two main objectives of China‟s foreign policy lately have been the access to oil 
and minerals as well as the access to foreign markets, especially those of Europe, Japan 
and North America.
11
 However, a detailed analysis conducted by Chinese officials has 
proved the viability of African markets for a range of low cost manufactured goods.
12
 
 
Given the increasing importance and strength China is acquiring due to its formidable 
and sustained economic growth and social transformation, the Chinese leadership 
believes that time has come for China to play a prominent role in world affairs and thus, 
promote Chinese principles and values.
13
 Therefore, the expansion of China‟s influence 
throughout the world can also be viewed as the third most important objective of China‟s 
foreign policy.
14
 
That being the case, there are three main factors that shape China‟s foreign policy in my 
view, which are: 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Xuewu Gu Von. China Returns to Africa. P18 
9
 Clough Langdon D. Energy Profile of China. January 30, 2007& CIA World Factbook. Energy Statistics, 
June 14, 2007 
10
 Hale David. How China Need for Commodities will Change Global Geopolitics. P120 
11
 Garth Shelton. Afro – Chinese Relations in an Era of Globalisaion. P238 
12
 Ibid.P238 
13
 Xuewu Gu Von. Op.cit. P8 
14
 Ibid.P8 
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 Access to key raw materials such as oil, timber and copper and cobalt;  
 Access to foreign markets, particularly those of developed countries, and 
 Increase the influence of China across the globe. 
   
 
1.1 CHINA IN AFRICA  
In light of the three main objectives of China‟s foreign policy mentioned above, it is clear 
that Africa is of vital importance in the eyes of Chinese policy makers. 
Firstly, since Africa possesses huge amounts of unexploited raw materials such as oil, 
copper, cobalt, timber and others, it is perceived as a strategic continent by Chinese 
policy makers.
15
 Although China is interested in a variety of raw materials, priority is 
given to the exploitation of oil.
16
 Various Chinese leaders have devoted their energy to 
the oil business with Africa and in the process accelerated the establishment of Chinese 
oil companies in Africa.
17
In fact, Chinese state owned oil companies such as China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) have invested US$ billions in the acquisition of oil blocks in 
Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Gabon and Libya.
18
Besides the oil sector, Chinese companies 
have also invested US$ hundreds of millions in the mining sector in countries such as 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
19
 
 
As mentioned already, Africa is also important to China as it represents an important 
market for Chinese manufactured goods. Although far from wealthy, many African 
consumers are increasingly able to afford Chinese manufactured goods as these are 
relatively cheaper compared to European or United States of America (US) manufactured 
goods.
20
  
                                                 
15
 Vines Alex. The Scramble for Resources : African Case Studies. P63 & Lyman Princeton. China‟s 
Involvement in Africa: A View from the US. P131 
16
 Xuewu Gu Von.op.cit.P15 
17
 Ibid.P15 
18
 Vines Alex.op.cit. P68-71& Xuewu Gu Von.op.cit.P17& AFP.Sinopec deepens oil investments in 
Angola. June 2006 
19
 Chunying An. Mining Industry Cooperation between China and Africa. P316-320 
20
 Center For Chinese Studies. China‟s Engagement of Africa: Preliminary Scoping of African Case 
Studies. P27& Chaponnière Jean Raphaël. Les échanges entre la Chine et l‟Afrique. P 159 
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The increasing purchasing power of many African consumers is fuelled by high 
economic growth that many African countries are enjoying, partially fuelled by China‟s 
strong demand for raw materials.
21
 However, Chinese exports of manufactured goods 
remain concentrated in a few African countries such as South Africa, Sudan and 
Nigeria.
22
 
 
Finally, Africa is important in the eyes of Chinese policy makers as they believe that it 
will be much easier to establish Chinese influence in Africa than in other regions of the 
world. Much as China wants to expand its influence all over the world, it is aware of the 
challenges that it has to face as a late industrializing nation in competing with well 
established powers for influence in the world.
23
 It is evident that European countries, the 
US and Japan consider Africa as a less strategic continent since Africa is besieged by 
wars, disease, poverty and hunger.
24
 Therefore, Chinese policy makers view Africa as a 
strategic location where China can quickly establish its influence as it will not have to 
compete with Western countries.
25
 
 
In an attempt to expand its influence over Africa, China has been using various tools 
including rhetoric and development assistance. In fact, as it will be discussed in this 
study, Chinese officials usually seek to seduce African leaders by reminding them that 
China has always been a sincere ally of Africa in its fight against colonialism and 
imperialism, implying that China cannot have imperialist tendencies toward Africa.
26
 
Also, to rally African support on specific issues such as human rights or the principle of 
non interference in state internal affairs, Chinese leaders have regularly claimed that 
China is still a member of developing countries and as such, China and African countries 
share common interests with a shared view on major international issues.
27
  
                                                 
21
 Center for Chinese studies. China‟s Engagement of Africa.op.cit.P27 
22
 Chaponnière Jean Raphael.op.cit.P158 
23
 Xuewu Gu Von.op.cit. P8 
24
 Ibid.P8 
25
 Ibid.P8 
26
 Yongpeng Zhang. Reality and Strategy Construction. P278 
27
 Yongpeng Zhang.op.cit.P274& Le Pere Garth& Shelton Garth. Afro-Chinese Relations: An Evolving 
South-South Partnership. P34 
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Consequently, they assert that China and Africa have to support each other in order to 
face the challenges of globalization and create a new world order.
28
 
 
Development assistance from the People‟s Republic of China usually takes various forms 
such as concessional loans, debt relief and grants.
29
 Concessional loans are usually given 
with the intention of contributing to the development of the recipient counties.
30
  Chinese 
concessional loans are usually given to resource rich countries, thereby providing China 
easy access to strategic resources such as oil, copper and cobalt.
31
 Nevertheless, Chinese 
concessional loans are well appreciated by African leaders, not only for their favorable 
terms but also because China sets minimal conditions on the delivery of concessional 
loans as well as grants.
32
 Chinese grants are usually extended for social projects 
(hospitals, recreational centers and schools), material assistance and technical assistance 
(training).
33
 The Chinese government has built various infrastructure such as hospitals, 
government buildings, power plants and football stadiums in almost all African countries 
and such gestures seem to convince some African leaders of the sincere friendship 
between China and Africa.
34
 
 
Finally, China has also undertaken significant actions with regard to debt relief. During 
the first Sino-African forum, Beijing (2000), China pledged to write off 10 billion yuan 
of debt owed by 56 African countries within a period of 2 years.
35
 China respected its 
promise as by June 2002, it had cancelled debts totaling 10.5 billion yuan.
36
 It is 
important to note that China cancelled a portion of African debts at a moment when 
developed countries were resisting such a proposal.
37
 It is obvious that such a measure 
increased China‟s credibility in Africa. 
 
                                                 
28
 Yongpeng Zhang.op.cit.P274& Le Pere Garth& Shelton Garth.op.cit.P34 
29
 Center for Chinese Studies. How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa. P2 
30
 Ibid.P12 
31
 Ibid. P5 
32
 Servant Jean Christophe. China‟s trade Safari in Africa. Le Monde Diplomatique May 2005 
33
 Center for Chinese Studies. How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa. Op.cit.P15 
34
 Xuewu Gu Von.op.cit.P13 
35
 Wenping He. All-Weather Friend. P40 
36
 Ibid.P40 
37
 Ibid.P40 
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1.2 CHINA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WEST? 
 
China‟s new foray into Africa has created fascination, hope and apprehension as well. 
Actually, many African leaders such as the chairman of the African Union, the president 
of Gabon Omar Bongo, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe as well as Angola‟s Jose Eduardo 
Dos Santos, have appreciated China‟s willingness to provide loans and grants to African 
countries without setting conditions related to good governance, transparency and human 
rights.
38
 These African leaders also appreciate China‟s huge investments in the 
construction of key infrastructure across African countries.
39
 Therefore, many African 
leaders perceive China as an alternative to the West since Chinese cooperation with 
Africa is free of interference in African internal affairs.
40
  Furthermore, some African 
leaders, such as South African‟s President Thabo Mbeki, consider China as a strategic 
partner in joining Africa to fight for the reform of international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
41
 
 
On the other hand, many leaders in the West have viewed China‟s new foray into Africa 
with skepticism. Several leaders in the west have voiced concerns over the possible 
impact of Chinese loans and grants on political and economic governance in African 
countries.
42
 These Western leaders are particularly worried given that most of the African 
countries China is involved with such as Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Zimbabwe and the 
DRC all rank high on foreign policy‟s states failed index.43For instance, China has been 
blamed for the prolongation of the war in Sudan‟s Darfur province as 80% of revenue 
generated by Sudan‟s oil fields have been used to purchase weapons and military 
materials.
44
  
 
                                                 
38
 Servant Jean Christophe. Op.cit 
39
 Ibid 
40
 Interview. 2 April 2008.Luanda 
41
 Shelton Garth.op.cit. P 259& Alden Chris. China-Africa Relations: The end of the Beginning. P145& Le 
Pere Garth& Shelton Garth. An Evolving South-South Partnership. P34 
42
 Princeton Lyman. China‟s Involvement in Africa: A view from the US. P135 
43
 Alves Philip & Draper Peter. China‟s growing role in Africa. P24 
44
 Vinex Alex.op.cit.P69 
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Another example is that just after China‟s EXIM Bank provided Angola a US$ 2 billion 
loan in 2004, the Angolan minister of finance announced that his country was no longer 
interested in pursuing talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which in part 
sought to establish more transparency in the country‟s oil sector.45 It comes as no surprise 
that the IMF, the World Bank as well as European Countries have expressed concern 
over the recent US$ 9 billion Chinese loan provided to the DRC, fearing that the loan 
could worsen economic governance and bring back the country to the old debt trap.
46
  
 
Finally, the diplomatic foray recently engaged by the US in Southern Africa to make sure 
that no country in the region accepts to offload weapons from a Chinese ship destined to 
Zimbabwe as the country is facing a serious political crisis, reflects US‟s ambivalence 
over China‟s engagement with controversial African regimes.47 Nevertheless, beyond 
these relevant concerns, it is also evident that many Western countries are not very 
pleased with the intrusion of China in what they considered as their reserved domain, 
Africa.
48
 Actually, some Western analysts have even portrayed China‟s involvement in 
Africa as pure neocolonialism, claiming China is the only beneficiary from its partnership 
with African countries as the middle Kingdom imports raw materials from African 
countries and exports its manufactured goods to Africa.
49
  
 
As China gets more involved in Africa, especially in those countries rich in natural 
resources, the above concerns expressed  by Western critics and academics are pertinent. 
In fact, African countries cannot afford to go blindly into their new partnership with 
China as they may not benefit in the short term and particularly in the medium and long 
term. The researcher sincerely believes that African countries can only benefit from their 
new partnership with China by having a long term vision. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Grion Moreso Emilio. The Political Economy of commercial relations. P154 
46
 Vandaele John. IPS. Development: La China l‟emporte sur les Europeens au Congo. 
47
 CNN. Ship Bound for Zimbabwe may Return Home, says Chinese Officials.  
48
 Berger Bernt. China‟s Engagement in Africa: Can the EU sit Back? P121 
49
 Vandaele John.op.cit 
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1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of China‟s investments on the Angolan 
economy as well as the impact of trade between China and Angola on the Angolan 
economy. This study will take a particular interest in the Angolan construction sector 
although it will not be limited to this sector. In addition, this study will also assess the 
impact of trade between China and Angola as well as the impact of Chinese investments 
on the Angolan population. 
 
 
This study will explore the following questions: 
i) What is the pattern of trade between China and Angola? 
ii)  What are the benefits that Angola gains from trading with China? 
iii) Is the Angolan population benefiting from trade between China and Angola? 
iv)  How can Angola maximise its benefits from trading with China?       
v) In which sectors of the Angolan economy have Chinese investments been 
concentrated?  
vi) Has the Angolan economy benefited from Chinese investments in terms of the 
transfer of technology, commercialization of new products, and diffusion of 
skills and creation of jobs? 
vii) How can Angola maximise its benefits from Chinese investments?   
viii) Have Chinese investments improved the daily lives of the Angolan 
population?              
 
Ultimately this study is assessing whether China‟s increasing ties with Angola can be a 
positive force for Angola‟s economic development.  
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1.4 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.4.1 Why I have Chosen Angola 
 The researcher has chosen Angola because China has been very involved in the country 
lately. For instance, Chinese banks have provided Angola with loans worth several US$ 
billions. In addition to that, Chinese companies have secured several US$ billions‟ worth 
of construction work. Also, Angola became China‟s first trade partner in Africa in 2006. 
Furthermore, China has also invested substantial amounts of money in the Angolan oil 
industry. 
 
Given this scenario, Angola will be a good case study since Chinese companies are 
heavily involved in investments, trade and loans in Angola. Moreover, since Angola is a 
weak but resource rich state
50
, it is hoped that the conclusion and recommendations that 
will be drawn from this study may have some relevance concerning the relationship 
between China and other weak but resource rich countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, 
Gabon, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
1.4.2 Why is the construction sector interesting? 
This study will pay particular attention to the Angolan construction sector for two main 
reasons. First, based on the nature of the researcher‟s contacts in Angola, it has been 
easier to have access to information regarding the involvement of Chinese companies 
operating in the construction sector. Second, as there is a proliferation of Chinese 
construction companies in Angola, the researcher believes that their presence may benefit 
Angola in terms of transfer of technology, diffusion of skills and creation of jobs. Also, it 
is believed that Chinese construction companies may provide Angola with the 
infrastructure needed to alleviate poverty and to facilitate the emergence of a strong and 
vibrant private sector. 
 
 
                                                 
50
 I mean by weak state a state which is basically unable to provide basic services such as security, 
education, health, electricity either to the entire population or to a significant section of the population. 
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1.4.3 Why is this subject interesting to me?                     
In light of the observations made so far in this chapter, one believes that China offers an 
enormous opportunity to Angola in terms of investments and trade. However, it is also 
borne in mind  that if Angola (as well as other African countries) wants to benefit from 
the opportunity offered by Chinese economic expansion in the medium and long term , it 
has to know precisely what it wants and how to get what it wants using its strengths and 
addressing its weakness.  The big question is: Does Angola really know what it wants and 
how to get that?   
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE  STUDY 
This study has five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter will 
provide an historical review of China- Africa relations since the 1950‟s. The third chapter 
will be devoted to trade between China and Africa. The fourth chapter will be devoted to 
Chinese investments in Angola. Finally, the fifth chapter will be the conclusion and 
recommendations. 
 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology will consist of a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Concerning the qualitative method, it will rely on a combination of books, publications 
(of institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank), 
newspaper articles, journals, and interviews. The interviews were conducted in Angola, 
especially in the cities of Huambo, Benguela and Luanda. They targeted businessmen, 
academics, civil servants and members of the civil society. Most of the respondents 
requested to remain anonymous. The quantitative method will rely on data collected from 
the IMF. 
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CHAPTER TWO:   AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CHINA – AFRICA 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In January 2006, China released its first official African policy, in which it emphasized 
the equal, peaceful, friendly, mutual and beneficial nature of its relationship with African 
countries. As highlighted in the preceding chapter many African leaders have welcomed 
the mounting Chinese presence in the continent with enthusiasm as China is perceived as 
a sincere friend of Africa, while politicians and scholars in the West have been more 
suspicious concerning the true motivations of the rising Chinese presence in Africa. 
Therefore, it is important for Angola to fully understand the factors shaping China‟s 
Angolan policy in order to implement policies and strategies that will allow Angola to 
reap maximum benefits from its relations with China. This chapter will attempt to 
understand the factors shaping China‟s Angolan policy as it will describe the shifts in 
China‟s African policy over five decades and analyze the factors that shaped China‟s 
African policy at each particular period. In addition, this chapter will also enable us to 
fully comprehend the attitudes and impressions of African leaders toward China through 
analyzing the interactions between China and the African continent since the late 1950‟s. 
 
 
2.2 Background of China’s African policy 
After the victory of the Chinese communists over the Kuomintang (whose leaders fled to 
Taiwan) in 1949, the new communist regime led by Mao Tse-Tung faced internal and 
external challenges.
51
On the internal front, the communist regime was preoccupied with 
consolidating its power and authority inside China. On the external front, the communist 
regime had to face the hostility of the US which supported the Kuomintang during the 
Chinese civil war.
52
  US support to the Kuomintang during the Chinese civil war was 
estimated at over one billion US$. 
53
  
                                                 
51
 Ogunsanwo Alaba. China‟s Policy in Africa 1958-71. P1 
52
 Ibid.P4 
53
 Hutchison Alan. China‟s African Revolution. P13 
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In addition, the communist regime had to fight for maximum recognition as Western 
countries refused to recognize it and also, the communist regime sought to obtain a 
Chinese seat at the United Nations Security Council.
54
 
 
Thus, the immediate foreign policy of China after the civil war was shaped by internal 
and external factors. As a result, from 1949 China adopted the policy of international 
communism, which strongly rejected any neutrality and recognized the leadership of the 
Soviet Union. Consequently, the Communist regime took a hostile stance toward the US 
and its protégé, Taiwan.
55
  China also sought to obtain recognition and establish good 
relations with communist countries. It is therefore evident that initially China did not 
have a policy on Africa. 
 
In June 1950, the Korean War began between the North Koreans supported by the Soviet 
Union and South Koreans supported by the West. At the beginning of the war, the North 
Korean armed forces advanced rapidly as the South Korean armed forces began to 
collapse. However, the intervention of the US and other countries forced the North 
Korean forces to begin a strategic retreat.
56
 When it became obvious that the United 
Nations forces under the command of the US were about to take control of North Korea, 
China decided to get involved in the war in order to prevent the US from controlling 
neighboring North Korea.
57
 As a result of China‟s intervention in the war, the Korean 
War ended in a stalemate in 1953. The Korean War exacerbated the tension between the 
US and China.   
 
In 1952, President Eisenhower took office in the White House. His administration 
embarked on a policy of isolating the communist regime throughout the world.
58
  
 
 
                                                 
54
 Ogunsanwo op.cit. P4 
55
 Ibid.P4 
56
 Ibid.P4 
57
 Ibid.P5 
58
 Ibid.P7 
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Thus, in addition to the economic and commercial sanctions imposed on China and to the 
full protection extended to the defeated Chinese government in Taiwan by the previous 
Truman administration, Eisenhower‟s administration proceeded to organize military 
alliances in Asia with the states surrounding China.
59
As the result of the radicalization of 
US policy toward China, the communist regime decided to modify its foreign policy.  
 
In order to resist the aggressive US policy aimed at isolating China, the communist 
regime decided to change its attitude and position toward it neighbors, even toward the 
non-aligned ones like India.  China‟s new foreign policy intended to reassure its 
neighbors that they had nothing to fear and China was prepared to have good relations 
with them, hoping that they would not sign military alliances with the US, which would 
have facilitated the set up of US military bases around China.
60
  
 
In 1954, Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai traveled to India where he signed the 
principles of peaceful coexistence with the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
61
 
According to the principles of peaceful coexistence, the two countries pledged 
themselves to “i) Mutual respect for each other‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty; ii) 
Mutual non-aggression; iii) Mutual non-interference in each other‟s internal affairs; iv) 
Equality and mutual benefit, v) Peaceful co-existence.”62In addition, China also signed 
boundary and friendship treaties with other neighboring countries such as Mongolia, 
Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan and Burma.
63
 
 
In April 1955, China joined twenty-two Asian and six African states at the Bandung 
Conference, in Indonesia, aimed at discussing common problems.
64
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The African states represented in Bandung were: Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, 
Sudan and Libya. Although the Chinese did not go to Bandung with the intention of 
making contacts with the Africans, China‟s Prime Minister Chou eventually had talks 
with Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser.
65
   
 
Soon after the Bandung Conference, Chinese interests in Africa accelerated. In fact, in 
1956, Chinese cultural missions visited Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Ethiopia.
66
 More significantly, in May 1956, diplomatic relations between China and 
Egypt were established, and the assistant minister of China‟s foreign affairs, Chen Chia- 
Kang was nominated as ambassador to Egypt.
67
 Just a week after the arrival of the 
Chinese ambassador to Cairo, President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, thus 
prompting the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in autumn 1956.
68
 During the crisis, 
China provided Egypt 1.8 million sterling of loan, and offered a gift of materials 
estimated atUS$4.7 million coupled with a promise to send volunteers if asked by the 
Egyptian government.
69
 Egypt genuinely appreciated the support it received from China, 
and after the Suez crisis, which ended with the withdrawal of the British and French 
forces, the relationship between China and Egypt matured.
70
 
 
The withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt came as a surprise to the 
Chinese leadership as the latter could not imagine that an invasion of an African country 
by Western powers could fail.
71
 Shortly after the Suez crisis, the Chinese leadership 
realized that liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America fighting European 
colonialists could win their struggles if they benefited from the support of Communist 
countries. Thus according to the Chinese leadership then, the prospect of revolution was 
good in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
72
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The corollary to this was that in September 1956, Chairman Mao declared, “We must give 
active support to the national Independence and Liberation Movements in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, as well as to the Peace Movement and righteous struggle in all 
countries throughout the world.”73 
 
The decisive change in China‟s foreign policy came in the autumn of 1957 when the 
Soviet Union successfully launched an earth satellite and an intercontinental ballistic 
missile.
74
 For the Chinese leadership, this new technological development was a sign that 
the communist world was stronger than the “imperialist” world. Hence whist addressing 
the Moscow meting of communist and workers‟ parties in November 1957, Chairman 
Mao made a famous speech in which he said: 
“It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. 
There are two winds in the world today, the East wind and the West wind. There is a 
Chinese saying ‘Either the East wind prevails over the West wind or the West wind 
prevails over the East wind.’ I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the 
East wind prevails over the West wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have 
become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.”75 
 
Moreover, Mao and Chou argued that the Soviet military superiority would deter the 
West from undertaking local and general wars against the communist countries. Mao and 
Chou asserted that China and other communist countries could encourage revolution in 
colonized countries with little risk to themselves.
76
 As a result of China‟s shift toward the 
left, the Chinese communist party began asserting that peaceful coexistence and 
independence could only be achieved through struggle.
77
 
 
However, it is important to understand that China‟s new revolutionary ambitions in 
Africa were not altruistic in nature.  
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The Chinese embraced the Leninist dialectical conception that views human and material 
relationships in terms of contradictions. According to Lenin the three contradictions of 
capitalism are i) between labor and capital, ii) between imperialists competing for world 
markets and raw materials and iii) between colonial people and imperialists.
78
 In addition, 
Lenin asserts that these three contradictions lead to three kinds of conflict and war; i) 
between the proletariat and the capitalists, ii) imperialist wars, iii) wars of liberation.
79
  
Thus, following this Leninist view, imperialism could be defeated by engaging the 
imperialists on one of these three fronts. As a result, it is therefore understandable that the 
Chinese leadership saw the wars of liberation in the colonies as the most effective and 
safest way of fighting the imperialists, since once the imperialists were deprived of the 
raw materials from the colonies, their economies and military might would eventually 
collapse.  
 
Chairman Mao developed a famous theory in which the “imperialist” countries came to 
be compared with the cities of the world, while revolutionary movements operating in the 
colonies and semi colonies were compared to the countryside.
80
 Thus, according to Mao, 
if revolutionary movements could obtain the control of the countryside in a nation, the 
cities and towns would “be isolated and denuded of vital supplies and surrender, almost 
of their own accord.”81So, in order to support liberation wars in Africa, Chinese 
diplomats posted in Cairo, started observing the situation on the African continent, 
studying the situation in some specific African countries and contacting various exiled 
political leaders who had offices in Cairo.
82
 As the result of their assessment of the 
situation in Africa, the Chinese diplomats divided their activities in Africa according to 
three categories of states: 
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 i) Politically independent African states, classified either as progressive or as pro-
imperialist,  
ii) Advanced colonial areas such as Algeria and Cameroon and 
iii) Colonial territories which were calm at the time although growing in political 
awareness or even clamoring for independence, such as the Congo.
83
 
 
Concerning the first category of states, the Chinese objectives were both short and long 
range. The short range objective was to break through the barriers of suspicion created by 
“imperialist” propaganda by establishing trade, diplomatic relations and eventually aid 
while at the same time persuading the newly independent states to adopt an anti-Western 
brand of neutralism.
84
 The long range objective was to help train, finance and organize 
indigenous revolutionary cadres who would eventually seize power.
85
 
 
 
Regarding the second category of states, total Chinese support would be given to African 
liberation movements to enable them to complete the struggle successfully.
86
 
With regard to the last category of states, the Chinese decided to help African liberation 
movements advance toward the stage of armed struggle. The Chinese also decided to 
persuade those African countries that had already won political independence to support 
the “struggle masses” in other African countries.87It is important to note that China‟s 
assessment according to which the US was the biggest enemy of the “struggle masses” 
was in accordance with China‟s strategic interests as it considered the US the biggest 
threat to its security and survival. 
 
Although of lesser importance, it is also important to note that by getting involved in 
Africa China hoped to obtain recognition from African countries and their support for a 
Chinese seat in the UN Security Council.
88
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In addition, as China considers Taiwan part of its territory, China also sought to convince 
African countries to deny any recognition of Taiwan and to support its exclusion from the 
UN.
89
   
 
By 1958, there were ten independent African countries, Ethiopia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, 
Sudan, Ghana, Liberia, Tunisia, South Africa and Guinea.
90
 Thus, China tried to 
influence the foreign policy of these newly independent states by using a variety of 
strategies such as cultural visits, trade, diplomatic relations and even aid, although the last 
mentioned strategy was minimal in the 1950‟s.Cultural visits consisted of two kinds of 
delegations: i) Chinese delegations to Africa dealing with cultural, political and economic 
affairs ii) African delegations to China composed mostly of politicians, intellectuals and 
even businessmen.
91
  
 
The African delegations to China were usually invited by various Chinese political 
organizations which also sponsored the visits. The main objective of these cultural visits 
was to foster friendly ties between China and African countries, in the hope that African 
countries would recognize China and adopt an anti-Western policy.
92
 Thus, in 1958 
alone, more than twenty Chinese delegations visited Ghana, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Guinea and the Sudan where they organized a series of events such as sports 
demonstrations and drama.
93
 Forty four African delegations visited China in 1958 alone, 
ranging from civil society movements to government officials. These delegations were 
received by Chinese leaders including Chairman Mao.
94
 The African delegates visited 
many sites such as the people‟s communes and various industrial plants.  
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To convince their visitors that China‟s solidarity with Africa and its support for the 
independence of African countries were real, the Chinese invited their visitors to attend 
mass rallies to celebrate occasions such as “Algeria Day” and “Congo Week” during 
which the African delegates were astonished by the thousands of people who turned out 
for such demonstrations.
95
  
 
As far as trade was concerned, China‟s trade with African countries did not entirely 
operate in a political vacuum. China often used trade as a means to consolidate relations 
or even obtain the favor of some African countries.
96
 A good example of this strategy was 
China‟s willingness to buy Egyptian cotton in 1955 when Western countries were 
refusing to buy it at market price.
97
 Another good example was in 1965, when China 
agreed to help Tanzania by buying 3 million pounds of surplus tobacco that Tanzania was 
unable to sell to its normal purchasers.
98
 China made similar gestures toward the 
government of the Sudan and Zambia. Having said this, it is also important to assert that 
China‟s trade with African countries was also motivated by economic gain. In fact, China 
needed raw materials such as cotton and copper in order to produce manufactured goods 
such as textile and electric wires.
99
 In addition, Chinese exports of light industrial goods 
to Africa enabled China to build external reserves which were used to buy advanced 
industrial goods in Western Europe.
100
  
 
In the 1950‟s Chinese aid to African countries was modest because of three reasons. First, 
during that period, China was going through a severe economic crisis that limited the 
capacity of the country to provide substantial economic aid to African countries.
101
 
Second, during that time most African countries were still under colonialism, meaning it 
made no sense for China to provide aid to those countries.  
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Finally, unlike in the 1960‟s, the conflict between China and the Soviet Union had not 
erupted. As such, China did not need to compete for influence with the Soviet Union by 
providing substantial amounts of aid to African countries.
102
 Nevertheless, during the 
1950‟s China did provide very limited but effective aid to some African countries which 
were going through difficult times. We have already mentioned the example of Egypt 
where China made an immediate US$ 4.7 million grant to Egypt during the Suez crisis. 
Another example illustrating the effectiveness of limited Chinese aid during that period 
was the grant of 10 000 tons of rice to the Republic of Guinea in 1958, just when France 
had cut all economic aid to Guinea in an effort to punish this country for the premature 
and unilateral declaration of independence it had taken.
103
  
 
China‟s effort to gain recognition from African countries was partially rewarded in 1958 
by Morocco and in 1959 by the Sudan and Guinea.
104
 
 
During the 1950‟s, China gave its total support to Algerian and Cameroonian liberation 
movements that were fighting the colonialists. In 1958, the Algerian war which started in 
November 1954 became the fiercest fighting going on in the colonies. The Algerian 
nationalists regrouped under the National Liberation Front (FNL) and fought the French 
forces when France refused to grant independence to Algeria.
105
 China saw the war in 
Algeria as “a classic type of revolution in a colonial or semi colonial country” and as 
such China was determined to help the FNL achieve total victory over the French 
forces.
106
In the autumn of 1958, when the FNL announced the formation of a provisional 
revolutionary government, China recognized it. On top of that, China granted more than 
US$ 10 million to the FNL in 1958 alone.
107
 Also, China supplied the FLN with US 
automatic weapons captured during the Korean War as well as Chinese weapons and 
infantry equipment.
108
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During the same period, China also extended its total support to the Union des 
Populations du Cameroon (UPC), which was leading the anti-colonialist struggle in 
French Cameroon.
109
 According to the Chinese, Cameroon‟s seemed a promising 
revolutionary situation. Thus, the leader of the UPC, Felix- Roland Moumie, traveled 
twice to China where he made useful contacts with various political organizations. In 
addition, the UPC members were trained in China and later in Ghana‟s Nkrumah‟s 
Chinese-run guerilla camps.
110
 
 
During the end of the 1950‟s, China encouraged African leaders and national movements 
to engage in liberation wars against colonial powers. For instance, after the violent 
demonstrations that broke out in January 1959 in the Congo, China encouraged national 
movements in the Congo to engage in violent struggles. After the riot that broke out in 
January 1959 the Chinese commented:  
“the struggle of the people of Congo shows that today there is no longer an ‘oasis’ of 
stability in the world for the colonialists… The flame of anti-colonial rule is burning in 
the oasis of stability. This flame though not so big at the moment will eventually develop 
into a scorching prairie fire. Patrice Lumunba, delegate of the National Movement Party 
at the All African People’s Conference, said last year: ‘After eighty years of colonial 
rule, we are determined to break with the old regime. We want to bring a new 
countenance to our country, that of a people free from all yokes.‟”111 
 
The Chinese leaders perceived the Congo as central to the achievement of their foreign 
policy for three main reasons. First, Congo‟s “strategic” position in the heart of Africa 
made the Chinese believe that a successful revolution in the Congo would trigger other 
revolutions in Africa.
112
 Second, the Chinese considered the Congo as the only African 
country in which the US could become directly involved.  
 
                                                 
109
 Ogunsanwo op.cit.P53 
110
 Ibid.P55 
111
 Ibid.P55 
112
Weinstein op.cit. P58 
 28 
Thus, by instigating a guerilla war in the Congo, the Chinese hoped that the US would get 
more involved in the Congo and the more involved in the Congo the US became, the less 
involved it could be in Asian territories close to China.
113
 Finally, as the Congo possesses 
huge reserves of minerals such as uranium, copper and diamonds, the Chinese hoped that 
a successful revolution in the Congo would deprive the “imperialists” the control of these 
strategic minerals.
114
  
 
 
2.3 China’s African Policy during the 1960’s 
 
During the 1960‟s, two new important events happened that had an impact on China‟s 
African policy. The first event was the eruption of an open conflict between China and 
the Soviet Union, while the second event was the independence of seventeen African 
countries in 1960 alone.
115
 Of these seventeen countries that got independence in 1960, 
only two immediately recognized China and these countries were Mali and Somalia.
116
 
Ghana got independence in 1957 but recognized China in 1960.
117
 
  
The relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated mostly because of 
ideological and strategic reasons. From the late 1950‟s, the Soviet Union under the 
leadership of Nikita Khrushchev decided to adopt a soft position toward the West in order 
to achieve a peaceful coexistence between the communist and capitalist countries.
118
 
Khrushchev was actually concerned that a Soviet aggressive foreign policy could lead to 
a general and devastating war between the Soviet Union and the US.
119
On the other hand, 
the Chinese believed that the peaceful coexistence was impossible as long as the 
“imperialists” were not destroyed.  
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Consequently, the Chinese argued that the communist forces had to foster revolutions in 
colonies and semi colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America in order to deprive the 
“imperialists” of markets for their manufactured goods and sources of raw materials and 
thus, precipitate their collapse.
120
 
In addition, the idea of peaceful coexistence was against China‟s vital interests as its 
security was still threatened by the US and it was still isolated from the international 
community, especially the UN.
121
 
 
The conflict between China and the Soviet Union degenerated further in 1963, when the 
Soviet Union, the US and Britain signed in Moscow the nuclear ban test treaty which 
forbade other countries to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.
122
 In fact, the nuclear test 
ban treaty was perceived by China as a “plot to prevent China from acquiring her own 
means of defense.”123 Therefore, during the 1960‟s, China found itself in competition for 
influence not only with the US but also with the Soviet Union. The increasing number of 
independent African countries from 1960 meant that China had to mobilize more 
resources in order to compete against both the US and the Soviet Union. Actually, from 
1954 to 1971, China‟s aid to Africa amounted to 446 million sterling compared to the 
Soviet Union‟s 867 million sterling.124 
 
China continued to support the FNL in Algeria throughout the 1960‟s and tried to 
convince the FNL to reject President de Gaulle‟s proposals for a peaceful solution as the 
Chinese considered it  a mere French diversion aimed at deceiving the FNL. For the 
Chinese, the war had to be waged until the end in order to obtain total victory.
125
  
Finally, the independence of Algeria was proclaimed in 1962 after the Evian 
agreement.
126
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China also continued to provide its support to the UPC in Cameroon during the first half 
of the1960‟s. After the independence of Cameroon in January 1960, the UPC refused to 
stop fighting as the new President of Cameroon Ahmadou Ahidjo authorized French 
troops to remain in the country.
127
 The fact that Ahidjo refused to recognize China and 
recognized instead Taiwan prompted China to continue supporting the UPC rebels.
128
 
Thus, as the Soviet Union ceased to support the UPC, China took over part of the 
financing and the training of the UPC and more Cameroonians were sent to China for 
guerilla training.
129
 However, after the assassination of the UPC leader, Felix Roland 
Moumie in Switzerland in 1964, the UPC broke into many factions and became 
inefficient both inside and outside Cameroon.
130
 
 
In July 1960, just two weeks after the independence of the Congo, the country plunged 
into a civil war with the secession of the Katanga province.
131
 Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba requested the intervention of UN forces in order to restore peace and unity in 
his country.
132
 While the Soviet Union and African countries supported the intervention 
of UN forces in the Congo, China viewed the Soviet and African support of UN actions 
in the Congo as naïve since according to China UN forces would be used by the 
“imperialists” to protect their interests in the Congo.133After the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba in January 1961, China decided to support the rebel left wing government 
based in Stanleyville and led by a close collaborator of Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga.
134
 
Five months later, China recognized Gizenga‟s government and sent an ambassador to 
Stanleyville. However, when Gizenga and the authorities in Leopoldville formed a 
coalition government afterwards, the Chinese mission withdrew less than two months 
after arriving in Stanleyville.
135
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As it was unable to operate within the Congolese territory, China sought privileged 
sanctuaries in neighboring states including Rwanda, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville. 
Mao is on record for saying: “Burundi is the stepping stone for reaching the Congo.”136 
Hence China used Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville as a base for the support of Congolese 
rebels such as Pierre Mulele and Soumialot.
137
 However, in 1964, Belgian and American 
paratroopers totally defeated the Congolese rebels who fled to Sudan.
138
  
 
In the course of fostering revolutions in Africa, China sometimes had to plot against 
certain African governments. This was the case in Burundi when China supported the 
actions of some left wing Burundian politicians who planned a coup against the King of 
Burundi, Mwambutsa IV.
139
 Unfortunately for the Chinese, the coup plot was discovered 
and diplomatic relations between China and Burundi were suspended in 1965.
140
 
In the same vein, China also supported some subversive activities of the Tunisian 
communists against the government of Tunisia. China‟s support of Tunisian communists 
led to the break down of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1967.
141
 
 Finally, in the 1960‟s, six coups had happened in Africa: Congo Leopoldville, Dahomey, 
the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria and Ghana.
142
 Moreover, the military 
regimes that rose to power in Ghana, the Central African Republic and Dahomey ceased 
diplomatic relations with China in 1966.
143
 
 
2.4 Chou En Lai tour in Africa 
 
In December 1963, China‟s Prime Minister Chou En Lai accompanied by his foreign 
Minister, Chen Yi and forty officials toured ten African countries in six weeks.
144
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The countries visited by Chou were Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali, Guinea and Ghana.  The Chou trip to Africa was important not 
only because it was the first ever trip to Africa by a high position Chinese statesman but 
also because it marked the expansion of relations between China and Africa. One of the 
main and obvious objectives of Chou‟s trip to Africa was to consolidate friendship and 
cooperation between China and various African countries as well as to portray China as a 
big power.
145
  
 
During his African trip, Chou repeated to his hosts the five principles on which China‟s 
African policy rested: i) China‟s support to African countries in their fight against 
imperialism, old and new colonialism and for winning and safeguarding national 
independence, ii) China‟s support to the governments of  African countries in their 
pursuance of the policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment, iii) China‟s support to the 
African people in their desire to realize solidarity and unity in the form of their choice, 
iv) China‟s support to African countries in their efforts to solve their differences through 
peaceful consultations, v) China‟s commitment to the sovereignty of all African countries 
and her opposition to all encroachments and interferences in African countries‟ internal 
affairs.
146
 Also, during his long African journey, Chou reminded his African hosts of the 
“long friendship” that existed between China and Africa since the thirteenth century and 
also emphasized the similarities between China and African countries, because according 
to him, both China and Africa were victims of colonialism.
147
 Furthermore, as argued 
above, since China wanted to be perceived as a big power, Chou‟s trip to Africa was 
important in demonstrating China‟s ability to conduct an African policy independent of 
the Soviet Union and the US.
148
Finally, Chou and his delegation hoped that their trip to 
Africa would enable them to increase their knowledge of Africa and gauge for 
themselves how effective the Chinese presence in Africa was, in order to elaborate a 
more effective policy on Africa.
149
 
 
                                                 
145
 Ibid.P322 
146
 Ibid.P323 
147
 George Stevens Francis, African Consultant Network. The Chinese in Africa-An Historical Perspective. 
148
 Dutt op.cit.P322 
149
 Hutchison op.cit. P61 
 33 
Apart from the desire to consolidate friendship between China and African countries and 
to portray China as a big power, other important factors motivated Chou‟s long journey 
to Africa. Chou‟s trip to Africa occurred at a time when relations between the Soviet 
Union and China were seriously deteriorating. As such, the second main objective of 
Chou‟s trip to Africa was to break the isolation of China which the US and the Soviet 
Union were trying to achieve. 
150
 Thus, during his African trip, Chou sought to convince 
African leaders to agree to the organization of a second Afro-Asian (or second Bandung) 
conference that would have excluded the Soviet Union.
151
 The Chinese hoped that such a 
conference would propagate China‟s view on international issues such as the call for a 
larger representation in the decision making bodies of the United Nations and the 
condemnation of the nuclear test ban treaty.
152
 Also, China and Indonesia wanted the 
second Bandung conference to be held before the second non-aligned conference that was 
planned by Yugoslavia and Egypt. 
 
The last main objective of Chou‟s trip to Africa was to explain China‟s controversial 
position to African leaders on two hot issues, namely China‟s position on the nuclear test 
ban treaty as well as China‟s position on the Sino-Indian border dispute.153 Concerning 
these two issues, Chou adopted a conciliatory position in order to reassure China‟s 
partners.  Chou argued that China would never be the first to use a nuclear weapon and 
also claimed that China had gone beyond the proposals made by the Colombo powers on 
the resolution of the Sino-Indian dispute.
154
  
 
Regarding the outcome of Chou‟s trip to Africa, it can be argued that it was a relative 
success. During his visit to Africa, Chou was able to consolidate friendly relations with 
African countries. For instance, Chou‟s trip was rewarded with a formal recognition by 
Tunisia and an implicit one by Ethiopia.
155
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Ghana, Mali and Guinea moved closer to China‟s Leninist ideology as their leaders 
agreed with Chou that the greatest danger facing mankind derived from imperialism, 
colonialism and neo-colonialism.
156
Chou also managed to obtain explicit support in Mali, 
Ghana, Guinea, the Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia for the organization of a second 
Bandung Conference that would exclude the Soviet Union. Indeed, for Chou this 
represented a success. 
 
In spite of Chou‟s gains, none of the African countries that supported the idea of a second 
Bandung Conference assured Chou that they would not attend the second non-alignment 
conference.
157
 In addition, Chou was not able to dissipate the concerns of Tunisia, 
Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Nigeria over the alleged “Chinese subversive activities” in 
Africa.
158Chou‟s attempt to portray China as a great power did not succeed in North 
Africa.  The Chinese leader also learnt that the prevalence of Islam in North Africa 
rendered the Chinese Leninist ideology less attractive to the people of that region.
159
 
Moreover, the inability of China to compete with the Soviet Union in the provision of aid 
to the more developed economies of North Africa further tarnished the image of China as 
a big power.
160
 On top of that, China‟s incapacity to provide Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt 
and Algeria with sophisticated capital equipment needed for their industrialization 
convinced these countries of China‟s lack of development compared to the Soviet Union 
and the West.
161
 
 
As a result of Chou‟s trip to Africa, China considerably modified its African policy. From 
1965, it decided to concentrate its aid, trade and cooperation on Eastern Africa. China 
understood that its ability to influence North African countries was limited for reasons 
mentioned above.
162
 At the same time, China also noted that as in North Africa, Islam 
was also an obstacle to the expansion of communism in West Africa.   
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China also took into consideration the logistical problems in maintaining trade contacts 
with West Africa.
163
 
 
Having said that however, China still maintained strong relations with three West African 
countries – Ghana, Guinea and Mali. This was partly because these countries had 
diplomatic relations with China and were also more inclined ideologically towards 
China.
164
 In addition, Chinese aid had considerable impact in poor and small economies 
such as that of Mali and Guinea.
165
  Therefore, between 1957 and 1971, China granted 
Guinea 24 million sterling of aid.
166
 In addition, China built in Guinea a hydro-electric 
plant, factories as well as tobacco plantations.
167
 In Mali, China built tea and rice 
plantations, a textile mill, a “lightning” mach factory, ceramic works, brick factory and a 
sugar refinery.
168
 In Ghana, China gave that country a loan of 84 million sterling in 
1964.
169
  
 
As I argued above, China chose to concentrate her aid, trade and cooperation in Eastern 
Africa for the following reasons. Unlike in West Africa, East Africa has an entire 
coastline exposed to China; that means there were no logistical constraints to the contact 
between China and East Africa. Moreover, the countries of East Africa also grew cotton 
and produced copper that could be easily exported to China through the port of Dar es 
Salaam. Finally, as the Portuguese and the white minorities in South Africa and Rhodesia 
were not prepared to surrender power, liberation movements emerged in Angola, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia. Soon after, Dar es Salaam, the capital of 
Tanzania became the headquarters of most Southern African liberation movements. 
Therefore, China realized that it had to have good relations with East African countries in 
order to play a greater role in the liberation wars that were about to begin in Southern 
Africa.
170
  
                                                 
163
 Ibid.P81 
164
 Ogunsanwo. Op.cit.P214&216 
165
 Hutchison op.cit.P97 
166
 Ibid.P97 
167
 Ogunsanwo. op.cit.P215 
168
 Hutchison.op.cit.P98 
169
 Ibid.P98 
170
 Ibid.P82 
 36 
 
It came as no surprise then that in 1965, China made its biggest financial commitment 
ever in Africa when it agreed to build the Tanzania - Zambia railway (Tanzam), linking 
the town of Kapiri Mposhi in central Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam over a distance 
of 1850 km.
171
  The offer to build the Tanzam was made during the visit of President 
Nyerere of Tanzania to China in February 1965.
172
 The total cost of the project was 
estimated at US$ 501 million.
173
 China agreed to bring a financial contribution of US$ 
401 million in the form of a loan which was to be divided equally between Tanzania and 
Zambia.
174
Due to the shortage of foreign currency in China, it was agreed that 60% of 
China‟s loan would be repaid through the importation of Chinese goods during the 
construction period of the railway.
175
 This meant that Tanzania and Zambia were required 
to purchase a total of US$120 million worth of Chinese goods each.
176
 
 
The actual construction of the Tanzam only began in October 1970 and was completed in 
1975.  By building the Tanzam railway, China sought to lessen the dependency of 
Zambia on “hostile” Southern African countries, as Zambia could use the port of Dar es 
Salaam.
177
 The construction of Tanzam would also enable China to import copper from 
Zambia and eventually from Zaire.
178
 Finally, by building the Tanzam, China wanted to 
increase her prestige among African countries. Besides the Tanzam, China was also 
involved in other important projects in Zambia and Tanzania.
179
 
 
During the 1960‟s, China also provided considerable amounts of aid and technical 
assistance to countries such as Congo Brazzaville, Somalia and Mauritania.
180
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By the end of the 1960‟s, China had established diplomatic relations with thirteen African 
countries including Congo Brazzaville (1964), Kenya (1963), Tanzania (1961), 
Mauritania (1965) and Zambia (1964).
181
 
 
 
2.5 China’s African policy during the 1970’s 
  
 During the early 1970‟s, many African countries such as Senegal, Sierra Leone, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cameroon, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea recognized China at a time 
when its was actively campaigning for membership in the UN. 
182
In 1970, during the 
annual assembly of the UN, a simple majority of UN members voted for the first time in 
favor of the inclusion of China in the organization.
183
 The vote represented a large 
success of China‟s African policy as the majority of African countries voted in favor of 
China‟s admission to the organization.184Foreseeing the danger of a possible admission of 
China into the UN at the expense of Taiwan, the US had developed a proposal that would 
have allowed the admission of China at the UN while allowing Taiwan to retain its seat in 
the organization.
185
 The US tried to obtain the support of more than 90 countries to back 
their proposal, while the Taiwanese foreign minister embarked on an African trip in order 
to convince African countries to vote against the admission of China to the UN.
186
 
However, on Monday 25 October 1971, when Albania introduced a resolution calling for 
the expulsion of Taiwan and the admission of China to the UN, 76 countries voted for the 
Albanian resolution, including 26 African countries while 35 countries voted against the 
resolution, including 15 African countries.
187
 As a result, China was admitted to the UN, 
and a seat was given to it in the Security Council.
188
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As a result of its admission to the UN, China‟s African policy changed as it abandoned its 
subversive activities against established African governments.
189
 Failures of past Chinese 
attempts to foster revolutions as well as the prospect of future normalization of relations 
between China and the US encouraged China to adopt a more flexible policy on Africa, 
except in Southern Africa where China continued to support liberation movements. Thus, 
in the 1970‟s, China worked to expand its influence through more conventional bilateral 
trade and aid programs.
190
 It seemed that China was also willing to foster good relations 
with African countries in order to create a “market of tomorrow” as well as to secure 
future sources of raw materials for the Chinese economy.
191
 As such, in the 1970‟s, 
relations between China and African countries improved. In fact, China even established 
diplomatic relationships with pro-Western countries such as Zaire, Madagascar and 
Ethiopia.
192
 On top of this, China provided generous amounts of aid to countries with 
which it previously had bad relations such as Zaire, as well as countries whose relations 
with the Soviet Union had deteriorated, such as Egypt and the Sudan.
193
 
 
As mentioned above, throughout the 1970‟s, China continued to support liberation 
movements operating in Southern Africa. The country provided political and material 
support to various liberation movements such as UNITA in Angola, ZANU in Rhodesia 
and PAC in South Africa.
194Contrary to common belief, China‟s support to the various 
liberation movements operating in Southern Africa was actually limited and not 
substantial as it is thought to have been.
195
 The limited Chinese support to the liberation 
movements in Southern Africa could be explained through ideological, logistical as well 
as strategic factors.  Chairman Mao was of the opinion that the oppressed people had to 
rely first on their own means in order to continue their struggle and only later on could 
they get international assistance.
196
 It is also clear that China encountered logistical 
problems in supporting wars that were waged thousands of miles from Chinese territory. 
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Finally, it is also evident that China feared that a full Chinese support of liberation 
movements would prompt the Portuguese and the Rhodesians to strike back at Zambia, 
Tanzania and Congo Brazzaville.
197
  Actually, in 1969 China warned Tanzania, Zambia 
and possibly Congo Brazzaville of the danger of a pre-emptive strike from the South, 
taking into account that these three countries‟ armies were incapable of resisting attacks 
from the Portuguese and Rhodesian armies.
198
  China even went further and took some 
steps to boost the defense of Tanzania, Congo Brazzaville and Zambia. For instance, in 
addition to the training of the Tanzanian army, China provided Tanzania military aid 
comprising MIG jets, light tanks, patrol boats as well as infantry and support 
equipment.
199
  
 
 
 
2.6 China’s African policy during the 1980’s  
 
During the late 1970‟s,  China‟s foreign policy changed partly as a result of important 
changes that occurred in the international system such as China‟s admission to the UN, 
China‟s recognition by most African countries and China‟s success in asserting its 
influence in Africa.
200
 Internal developments within China also accounted for the changes 
in the country‟s foreign policy. In 1978, two years after the death of Mao and Chou, Teng 
Hsiao-P‟ing (Deng Xiaoping) became the new Chinese leader.201 Under Teng‟s 
leadership, the economic development and modernization of China became top 
priorities.
202
 As such, the two key objectives of China‟s foreign policy became: i) 
maintain political stability and security in  East and Central Asia  ii)  fostering strong 
cooperation with Western countries in the field of trade, investments, sciences and 
security.
203
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This shift in policy saw China making efforts to improve its relations with the US and 
other Western countries. The result was the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
China and the US in 1978.
204
 In addition, China also adopted a moderate position in its 
dispute with the Soviet Union in a bid to avoid military escalation in Central Asia.
205
 
 
This important shift in China‟s foreign policy had some implications for its African 
policy. In the 1980‟s, it became clear that Africa was of secondary importance to China. 
This came from the fact that China had achieved most of its African objectives and that it 
was now busy modernizing itself.
206
 Consequently, during the 1980‟s, the amount of 
Chinese aid to African countries was smaller compared to aid provided in the 1970‟s.207 
More importantly, during the 1980‟s Chinese leaders acknowledged the fact that China 
was still a poor and backward country and therefore, made it clear that its was unwilling 
and unable to devote its relatively scarce resources to Africa.
208
 This meant that contrary 
to the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, China was no longer willing to compete with the US and the 
Soviet Union for supplying aid to Africa. However, during that same period China 
maintained close relations with African countries. In fact, China still welcomed high-
level visits from African countries.
209
 From 1981 to 1989, 55 African countries visited 
China, almost six per year.
210
 In addition, as most African countries supported South 
Africa‟s African National Congress (ANC), in a bid to please African countries, China 
provided explicit support to the ANC throughout the 1980‟s, although in reality it was 
limited.
211
 Finally, China still provided small amounts of aid to specific African countries 
with an aim to secure its influence over those countries.
212
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2.7 China in Africa in the 1990’s 
 
As it was argued in Chapter 1, during the 1990‟s, China went through profound economic 
and social transformations. As cited previously, in two decades China‟s per capita income 
rose by more than 400 percent.
213
 In addition, over the last couple of years, China has 
scored an average annual growth of between 7 and 9 percent. Between 1978 and 1999, 
the number of people in extreme poverty decreased by 220 million in China.
214
 
 
As it was pointed out in Chapter 1, throughout the second half of the 1990‟s China 
became suddenly interested in Africa again. The surge of Chinese interest in Africa lies 
in that country‟s desire to access African raw materials such as oil and minerals as well as 
to access promising African markets.
215
 As highlighted also in Chapter 1, China‟s 
renewed interest in Africa can also be explained by the desire of Chinese leaders to 
expand their country‟s influence throughout the world. Therefore, Chinese leaders 
perceive Africa as a strategic region for China‟s outward ambitions.216  In brief, the quest 
for oil and minerals as well as the perception of the world by the new Chinese leaders 
brought slight changes on China‟s foreign policy. The subtle modification of China‟s 
foreign policy prompted Beijing to adopt a new African policy centered on economic 
cooperation. 
 
2.8 Jiang Zemin trip to Africa 
In May 1996, China‟s President Jiang Zemin who assumed office in 1989 after the 
Tiananmen trauma, made an historical trip to six African countries. Jiang Zemin‟s 
African trip can be seen as the first step towards the implementation of his new African 
policy which focused on access to African oil.
217
 During his African trip, the Chinese 
leader outlined a five point proposal on developing a long and stable Sino-African 
relationship. 
218
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The five proposals included: i) fostering sincere friendship, ii) interaction based on 
equality and respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, iii) common 
development on the basis of mutual benefit, iv) enhancement of consultation and co-
operation in global affairs , v) long term creation of a more splendid world.
219
 
In addition, Jiang Zemin took the opportunity of his 1996 African trip to reveal his new 
African policy centered on economic cooperation between China and Africa with an eye 
on the twenty-first century. 
220
 Jiang‟s new Africa policy laid the foundation for the 
consolidation of Sino-African relations. In fact, Jiang‟s African trip opened the way for 
the organization of the first ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in October 2000.
221
   
 
The objective of the first FOCAC was to strengthen economic relations between China 
and Africa as well as to consolidate areas of common interest.
222
 The two major topics of 
the forum focused on were “how to promote and establish a just and equitable new 
international order and on how to further strengthen cooperation between China and 
Africa on economic and social development”.223  During the conference, two important 
documents (the Beijing Declaration and the Program of Cooperation on Economic and 
Social Development) were adopted. In those two documents, the participants agreed on 
the need to expand trade, investments and joint projects between China and Africa as 
well as to consolidate cooperation in the fields of agriculture, transportation, medical 
care, the exploitation of natural resources and banking.
224
 In addition, China promised 
that it would set up special funds for encouraging Chinese firms to invest in Africa and 
train all kind of professional personnel.
225
 More importantly, China also pledged to 
cancel 10 billion Yuan (US $ 1.2 billion) of debts owed to it by 31 African countries over 
a period of two years.
226
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In December 2003, foreign and trade ministers of African countries as well as Chinese 
officials gathered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the second ministerial conference of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
227
 The main objective of the Addis Ababa 
conference was to review the progress made in implementing the agreements reached at 
the first FOCAC conference.
228
 During the conference, participants agreed on the need to 
consolidate cooperation between China and Africa, especially in the field of human 
resources, peace and security and agriculture.
229
 China also agreed to support the New 
Partnership for Africa‟s Development objectives by investing in infrastructural projects in 
Africa.
230
 In addition, China pledged to grant some African countries tariff-free treatment 
for their exports to China.
231
  On top of that, China promised to step up cooperation in 
tourism by encouraging more Chinese to travel to Africa. Following this last point, China 
has granted destination status to 11 African countries in order to promote tourism in those 
countries.
232
  
 
In 2004, Jiang Zemin‟s successor, Hu Jintao made a nine day tour to Africa, visiting 
Gabon, Algeria and Egypt. Hu Jintao‟s first African tour was largely intended to pursue 
Jiang‟s African policy. Hu Jintao consolidated and advanced Jiang‟s African policy 
further by making it clear that China‟s relations with developing countries formed a 
“cornerstone” of China‟s foreign policy.233 During his African tour, Hu Jintao expressed 
his willingness to expand trade between China and Africa and called for more 
cooperation in order to jointly explore oil and natural gas and eventually exploit them.
234
 
The fact that Hu Jintao visited Gabon and Algeria, two oil producing countries, signified 
that oil was at the center of Hu‟s African trip.235 For instance, during his visit to Gabon, 
Hu Jintao signed a memorandum of understanding to institute joint oil exploration, 
exploitation, refinement and exportation between China‟s Sinopec and Total Gabon.236 
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In April 2006, Hu Jintao made a second trip to three African countries, Morocco, Kenya 
and Nigeria.
237
 Hu Jintao‟s second trip to Africa in two years signaled the importance that 
China now attaches to the African continent. Still in 2006, China‟s Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao made a trip to seven African countries: Angola, Republic of Congo, Ghana, Egypt, 
Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa.
238
 During his stops in these African countries, Wen 
Jiabao signed a series of agreements on economic and energy cooperation.
239
 
 
Intensive Chinese diplomacy in Africa culminated in the third conference on the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation, in November 2006 in Beijing. The conference assembled 
some 48 heads of state and government and delegations from China and African 
countries.
240
  At the end of the conference, the participants called for the reform of the 
UN and the WTO in order to create a better and more balanced world for all.
241
 They also 
called for the consolidation of cooperation between China and Africa in the areas of 
science and technology, education, tourism, sports and culture. Finally, the participants 
declared the establishment of a new strategic partnership between China and Africa 
featuring “political equality and mutual trust, win-win economic cooperation and cultural 
exchange”.242 
 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
One of the most important lessons that should be remembered from this chapter is that 
China‟s involvement in Africa has never been altruistic at any particular moment. If 
anything, this chapter has shown that China first got involved in Africa after the Bandung 
conference in 1955 in a bid to resist US pressures aimed at isolating it from the rest of 
world. It is evident that China considered its recognition by third world countries 
important for its survival as well as for the isolation of Taiwan. 
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This chapter has then argued that as the result of both the upgrading of Soviet military 
capabilities in 1957 and of the shift of Chinese leaders to the left, China‟s African policy 
was shaped by Leninist ideology. However, as it has been explained in this chapter, 
China‟s support and promotion of revolutions in Africa was consistent with its topmost 
objective at that moment, which was the destruction of the US.  
 
 It has also been indicated that during the 1960‟s, China increased substantially the 
amount of aid to some African countries in an effort to maintain its influence over those 
African countries, amid fierce competition with the Soviet Union and the US. In addition, 
China‟s aid to particular African countries, such as the construction of Tanzam was also 
part of a large Chinese plan aimed at furthering China‟s revolutionary objectives 
particularly in Central and Southern Africa. 
 
Furthermore, it was asserted that during the 1970‟s, China still wanted to be perceived as 
a great power by Africans. This explains why China continued to provide aid to some 
African countries, including those China previously had bad relations with. China also 
continued to provide support to liberation movements for the same reason. However, as 
explained in this chapter, since the 1980‟s the economic modernization of China has been 
central to its foreign policy. China‟s growth over the past two decades means that the 
country needs raw materials as well as markets for its manufactured products in order to 
sustain its robust economic growth. Thus, one of the main objectives, if not the vital 
objective of China‟s current African policy is the determination  to further Chinese 
economic interests in Africa in terms of access to crude oil and other minerals. As a 
result, since 2004, China has been very active in resource rich countries like Angola 
where it has invested billions of dollars in the oil industry. It is very likely that during the 
next years, China will further increase her presence in the oil industry in Africa 
(particularly in Nigeria and Angola) as her daily consumption of oil is predicted to rise 
sharply in the coming years. 
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Finally, this chapter also explained the reason why some African leaders welcome China 
with open arms and consider that country a sincere friend of Africa. Actually, since the 
1950‟s Chinese rhetoric has always claimed that China is on the same side with African 
countries in their fight against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism. Besides, 
China did indeed support the Algerians (FNL), the Rhodesians (ZANU), the Angolans 
(UNITA) and the South Africans (PAC) in their respective struggles for liberation. 
 Moreover, Chinese propaganda has consistently tried to establish similarities between 
China and Africa as far as the level of development is concerned. The fact that China is 
granting loans to African countries with minimal conditionality pleases some African 
leaders. Besides, China is also providing practical aid to most African countries by 
building schools, hospitals and public buildings. Such gestures certainly leave many 
Africans impressed and touched.  
 
Having said this, however, the government of Angola should not ignore that besides 
some friendly gestures, the main objective of the Chinese presence in Angola is to access 
Angolan crude oil. In essence, this reality implies that China is in Angola in order to 
pursue its national interests, some of which may not be compatible with the long term 
interests of Angola. This reality suggests that without a long-term vision and well 
elaborated strategies, Angola may not really benefit from its relationship with China in 
the long-term. The vision and strategies that Angola may elaborate and implement in 
order to benefit from this propitious opportunity will be discussed in the following 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3: TRADE BETWEEN CHINA AND ANGOLA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the civil war that commenced in 1975, Angola had a diversified economy that 
included a striving agriculture sector, a healthy fisheries industry, a striving oil sector as 
well as a manufacturing sector serving the local market.
243
 In fact, during the 1970‟s, 
Angola was self-sufficient in food and was a major exporter of cash crops, such as 
tobacco, cotton and coffee.
244
 In addition, Angola used to produce light manufactured 
goods such as foodstuffs and consumer goods.
245
 However, during the civil war that 
occurred in the country, much of Angola‟s road and railway infrastructure was destroyed. 
Moreover, insecurity and landmines made it virtually impossible to farm and the 
movement of populations to towns deprived subsistence and commercial agriculture of 
the necessary human and resource capital needed to function.
246
 It also meant that 
industries using raw material from the agriculture sector or supplying goods to the rural 
population lost their markets.
247
 The nationalization of private companies (excluding 
those in the oil and diamond industries) by the Marxist-Leninist led MPLA government, 
further marginalized the Angolan private sector. As a result, the agriculture and 
manufacture sectors collapsed.
248
  
 
Nevertheless, Angolan offshore oil fields enabled the oil sector to escape the economic 
disruption caused by war.
249
 Thus, over the years Angola‟s oil production increased 
despite the prolonged war. 
250
 The end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, coupled with the 
surge in the demand for oil globally, accelerated the development of the Angolan oil 
industry as numerous firms invested large sums of money in the industry.
251
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 For instance, from 2002 to 2006, Angola increased its export of crude oil from 311.5 
million barrels to 535 million barrels, or an increase of 71.7%.
252
During the same period, 
exports of diamond were a major source of finance for UNITA as the rebel movement 
controlled the Northeast of Angola, a region rich in diamonds.
253
 By 2001, “conflict 
diamonds” exported from Angola were considerable to the point that they were estimated 
to be equivalent to the production of an entire country.
254
 With the return of peace in 
Angola, the diamond industry has been growing considerably too. In fact, from 2002 to 
2006, the volume of carats exported by Angola increased from 5022300 million carats to 
9362500 million carats, or an increase of 86.4%.
255
  In addition, in a bid to add value to 
the production, a joint venture specializing in polishing and cutting diamonds opened in 
November 2005.
256
 This joint venture was formed by the state diamond company 
Endiana, the Angolan consortium PROGEM and Lev Leviev Diamond (LLD), the 
world‟s second-largest diamond trade company.257 The joint venture is so far the largest 
in Africa and it employs 400 technicians.
258
  
 
It is therefore obvious that the Angolan economy is dominated by the oil sector and to a 
lesser extent the mining sector while the other sectors of the economy are still to recover 
from the long civil war (see annex 1). For instance, the share of both the diamond, oil and 
gas sectors in the Angolan GDP was 59.83%, 67.27% and 61.75% respectively in 2004, 
2005 and 2006
259
(  see annex 1). In addition, oil exports accounted for more than 80% of 
fiscal revenue in 2005.
260
  
 
The volume of trade between China and Angola has been growing significantly over the 
last couple of years.  
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In 2002, the volume of trade between China and Angola amounted to US$ 1.141 billion 
while in 2005 it amounted to US$ 6.95 billion or an increase of 41.6%.
261
In 2006, Angola 
became China‟s first trade partner in Africa, out pacing South Africa. Actually, the 
volume of trade between China and Angola reached US$ 11.8 billion in 2006.
262
  Since 
then, trade volume between the two countries has continued to rise tremendously.  
Therefore, trade between Angola and China represents a vital aspect of the relationship 
between these two countries. Thus, it is important for Angola to formulate and implement 
a trade policy that will allow it to reap the maximum benefit from trading with China. 
This chapter aims to study the evolution and structure of trade between the two countries. 
In addition, this chapter will also assess the benefits that Angola derives from trading 
with China. Finally, the chapter will provide some recommendations to the government 
of Angola in order to position the country to reap the maximum benefit from its trade 
relationship with China in the short, medium and long term. 
 
3.2 Pattern of trade between China and Angola 
 
As pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, the Angolan economy is skewed toward 
the oil and mineral (diamond) industries as a result of historical and political factors. In 
addition, as explained in Chapter 1, China‟s interests in Africa are primarily motivated by 
business imperatives – the access to African oil and minerals as well as the search for 
markets for Chinese manufactured products. Since the end of the Angolan civil war in 
2002, China has invested several billion (US$) in the Angolan oil sector. For instance, in 
2004 China‟s Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank) extended the first oil-backed US$ 2 
billion credit line to the Angolan government.
263
 According to the terms of agreement, in 
exchange for the loan payable at an interest rate of 1.5% over 17 years with a grace 
period of 5 years, Angola has to provide China with 10 000 barrels of oil per day.
264
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In addition, in 2006, Sinopec formed a joint venture with the Angolan state owned oil 
company, Sonangol. Sinopec‟s contribution to the joint venture was estimated at 2.4 
billion US$.
265
 The Joint Venture enabled Sinopec to acquire stakes of 27.5%, 40% and 
20% in three off shore blocs with reserves estimated at 3.2 billion barrels of oil.
266
 
Sinopec owns 75% in the joint venture, Sonangol Sinopec international.
267
 As a result of 
these developments, China‟s oil imports from Angola have been growing significantly, 
and since 2006, Angola is the first supplier of crude oil to China, supplying 15% of 
China‟s total imports.268 In fact, 45% of Angola‟s oil exports are destined to China. 269  
 
However, China‟s imports from Angola have been exclusively concentrated in crude oil, 
which seems logical given the nature of the Angolan economy and the immediate 
interests of the Chinese. For instance, over the period 1997 to 2006, oil imports 
accounted for more than 99% of China‟s imports from Angola ( see annex 2a).On the 
other hand, as a result of the weakness of the manufacture and agriculture sectors in 
Angola, the African country is importing foodstuffs and manufactured products from 
overseas, China included.
270
  Angola imports from China manufactured products such as 
motorcars, construction and electrical equipment as well as machinery 
271
 (See annex 2b). 
 
Nevertheless, contrary to most African countries whose consumers prefer Chinese 
manufactured products because of their affordable price, Angolan imports from China 
represent a small share of Angola‟s overall imports.   In 2006, imports from China 
accounted only for 8.3% of Angola‟s total imports, while imports from the European 
Union and the US accounted for 35.17% and 14.3% respectively.
272
However, the 
Angolan government is not able to trace the importations of manufactured goods from 
China especially since many Chinese “micro traders” have joined the informal sector.273 
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In addition, some goods are purchased by European companies from China and then 
redirected to Angola, and in the process distorting the origin of imports.
274
 The same goes 
for Chinese goods which are bought by South Africans and Middle Eastern companies 
and then redirected to Angola. As a result, the importation of Chinese goods into Angola 
is quite underestimated. 
 
 
3.3 The impact of trade between China and Angola on the Angolan economy 
 
As we discussed above, the pattern of trade between Angola and China is typically 
“colonial” in nature as Angola exports raw materials to China and imports manufactured 
goods from the latter. However, one could ignore this view and stress instead the fact that 
trade between China and Angola is driven by complementarities between the two 
economies rather than by Chinese colonialist ambitions. 
 
One could also argue that China is the clear winner in the trade between the two countries 
as it exports manufactured goods to Angola and at the same time imports oil needed to 
sustain its phenomenal economic growth. Much as China may be the clear winner in this 
exchange relation, it does not mean that Angola is not benefiting from it, especially in the 
short term. Actually, Angola does benefit from trading with China. 
 
First of all, China‟s significant imports of Angolan oil are having a positive impact on 
Angola as a country. As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, China is now comes 
first in the importation of Angolan crude oil, importing 45%, out pacing the US which 
imports around 30%.
275
 The continuous substantial increase in the price of crude oil, 
coupled with the strong surge in Angola‟s oil production has enabled Angola to 
substantially increase its revenue.  
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The average yearly price of a barrel of crude oil has increased from US$ 31.49, 40.83, 
56.27 and 65.14 in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively.
276
 In addition, the price of a 
barrel of crude oil reached US$ 90 in the second semester of 2007 and the symbolic level 
of US$100 in early 2008. 
 
It can be seen from Table 1 below that the Angolan government revenue has been 
increasing significantly since 2003. It is also evident that the bulk of the Angolan 
government revenue is from the oil sector. In 2006, for instance, 80.17% of total 
government revenue (0.372*100/0.464) came from the oil industry. It can also be 
observed that in 2007, 77.1% of total government revenue (0.266*100/0.345) was from 
the oil industry as well. Table 1 further reveals that from 2005, the Angolan government 
has been able to eliminate fiscal deficit. If one looks at the overall balance (which 
measures the difference between total revenue and total expenditure) it can clearly be 
seen that it is negative in 2003 and 2004 (indicating fiscal deficit). However, from 2005 
to 2007, it can be seen that the overall balance is positive (indicating a fiscal 
surplus).Thanks to the increasing level of revenue associated with rising crude oil prices 
and domestic oil output, Angola has been able to eliminate fiscal deficit.  
  
Angola has also been able to accumulate an important amount of foreign currency as a 
result of rising oil exports. The Angolan government has been injecting much of its 
international reserves into the economy in order to boost the local currency (Kwanza) and 
stabilize the exchange rate in order to curb inflation.
277
  Consequently, the Kwanza has 
appreciated and inflation has been curbed. The level of inflation came down from 18.5% 
in 2005 to 12.3% in 2006.
278
 Since 2006, the rate of inflation has remained around 12%. 
Although one cannot entirely attribute the successes that Angola has achieved in the 
management of its macroeconomic policies to its partnership with China, it is clear that 
Chinese investments in the Angolan oil industry and the subsequent rise in Chinese 
imports of Angolan crude oil have played a vital role in the improvement of Angolan 
macroeconomic parameters.  
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Table 1: Angola: Selected Economic Indicators, 2003-2007 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Fiscal 
accounts Percentage of GDP, unless otherwise indicated 
      
Total Revenue 37.9 36.9 40.7 46.4 34.5 
of which : oil 27.9 28.4 32.3 37.2 26.6 
Grants 0.8 0.5 0.2 0 0.1 
Total 
expenditure 44.3 38.5 33.3 31.6 33.6 
Overall 
balance -6.4 -1.6 7.3 14.8 0.9 
Source : IMF 
It is well known that Chinese manufactured goods are much cheaper compared to 
Western and Japanese ones. This is not only a direct consequence of lower labour costs in 
China but also of overcapacity in the marketplace.
279
 Indeed, labour costs are cheaper in 
Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania than in China.
280
  South African business 
consultant Martin Davies argues that lower prices of Chinese manufactured goods are 
also due to strong competition in China where for instance, thirty- five thousand textile 
and garment manufacturers (mostly private companies) compete against each other.
281
 
The result is too many goods chasing too few consumers in China and that results in 
lower prices. 
 
Since the majority of Angolans live below the poverty line (less than 1 dollar a day),
282
 
they are more willing to purchase cheap Chinese manufactured goods as they can easily 
afford them. For instance, in the city of Huambo, many Angolans prefer to buy Chinese 
imported motorbikes than the Japanese Yamaha motorbikes assembled in Huambo.
283
 
Actually, one Chinese imported motorbike with a 50 cm³ cylinder costs around 1500 
US$, while a Japanese motorbike of the same cylinder costs more than 2000 US$.  
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Thus, most Angolans who cannot afford to buy Japanese motorbikes buy Chinese 
motorbikes and use them as taxis.
284
 Hence, the city of Huambo is full of motorbike taxis 
imported from China. Chinese motorbikes also provide Angolan farmers with effective 
and fast transport means and as a result farmers can travel easily from the city to their 
farms.  It is therefore clear that these cheap Chinese motorbikes have a positive impact on 
the lives of many Angolans as they allow them to earn a decent living.
285
 
 
In addition, Angola‟s engagement in a vast reconstruction program since the end of the 
civil war in 2002 means the country needs huge amounts of cement and other 
construction materials in order to build the urgently needed infrastructure. However, 
there are only two cement factories in Angola – one is located in the capital Luanda and 
the other in Lobito, Benguela Province. According to an employer of a Chinese company 
that imports cement from China, the cement factory located in Lobito is not functional, 
thus the one located in Luanda is incapable of satisfying the local demand.
286
  He even 
argues that sometimes the cement factory in Luanda completely shuts down its 
production for days because of shortages of funds or raw materials.
287
He further argues 
that the importation of cement from China is very beneficial to the Angolan economy 
since according to him, if there were no imports from China, a 50 kg bag of cement 
produced locally which is currently at US$ 9.50 would have been at around US$ 50.
288
 
He then explains that although a 50 kg bag of cement costs US$ 1 in China, the same bag 
is sold at US$ 11.50 in Angola because of high transportation costs as well as customs 
inefficiencies. He further claims that if Angola were to import cement from Europe it 
would not be viable as it will be too costly. 
289
Cement imported from China is better than 
that produced locally in Angola, he also adds.
290
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Furthermore, a CEO of an Angolan research center argues that many Angolans travel to 
China to purchase manufactured goods. He even claims that some Angolans work 
together with the Chinese in retail shops.
291
 
 
Nevertheless, one of the main problems associated with trade between Angola and China 
has been the presence of Chinese “petty traders” or “micro traders” who pose a direct 
threat to Angolan traders. For instance, one European businessman based in the city of 
Huambo argues that once the Chinese see African traders buying a considerable amount 
of certain goods in their country, Chinese traders then move into those African countries 
with a considerable amount of the same goods.
292
 He claims that this is what is exactly 
happening in Angola where Chinese traders own retail stores and thus, pose direct 
competition to Angolan traders. The manager of a prominent foreign non governmental 
organization in Angola corroborates this view and adds that the Chinese are creating 
strong networks in Angola (e.g. Chinese traders involved in the selling of basic goods) 
and this is creating tensions between the Chinese and Angolans.
293
 He believes that for 
the moment there are no signs of high tension as is the case in Zambia.
294
 One Angolan 
economist and prominent member of the opposition party even claims that there are no 
exact statistics concerning the number of Chinese living in Angola.
295
 There are between 
20 000 and 30 000 Chinese living in Angola.
296
 The fact that the majority of the Chinese 
living in Angola enter the country without a visa, mainly explains the difficulty of 
accounting for the Chinese population living in Angola.
297
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3.4 Some lessons to be learnt from the current trade between China and Angola 
 
From what has been described so far, it is clear that Angola and China are both winning 
from their trade relationships. However, Angola can still do more in order to maximize 
the benefits of its trade with China in the short term. Also, Angola needs to make sure 
that in the long term the country will reap maximum benefits from trading with China.  
 
3.4.1 In the short term 
The government of Angola should control the number of Chinese entering the country, 
especially the “petty traders.” Since Chinese petty traders are involved in the same 
activities as the Angolans and bearing in mind the strong commercial networks that the 
Chinese are establishing in Angola, it is very probable that in the near future this situation 
will lead to stiff competition between the Chinese petty traders and Angolan ones. Such 
competition will not only marginalize Angolan traders but also create strong resentment 
toward Chinese petty traders.  Therefore, the government of Angola should protect the 
interests of Angolan traders by making sure that the number of Chinese petty traders 
operating in Angola remains limited. The government of Angola can achieve that by 
imposing visa requirements on every Chinese immigrant that enters Angola. The 
government of Angola can also compel Chinese petty traders to pay higher taxes to 
discourage other Chinese petty traders from settling in Angola. 
 
Angola should also expand trade with China, as this will benefit the majority of Angolans 
who can easily afford Chinese manufactured goods in contrast to European or American 
manufactured ones. The government of Angola can achieve that by discouraging the 
importation of expensive products (originally from China) from middle trading men in 
Europe, Dubai or South Africa. Moreover, the government of Angolan with the 
assistance of the Chinese diplomatic mission in Luanda should make pertinent 
information on China (e.g. customs laws and regulations) available to Angolan traders.  
Apart from that, the government of Angola should also make sure that Angolan traders 
have access to relatively cheap credit and to unproblematic and prompt business licenses.  
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These measures will prevent a situation whereby only a few privileged traders are able to 
reap the benefits from this business. The measures will also encourage concurrence 
between the various traders and therefore have a positive effect on prices of items 
imported from China. 
 
It is worth noting that access to credit in Angola is problematic. The European 
businessman from Huambo argues that interest rates are very high in Angola.
298
 This is 
partly a consequence of the attempt by the government to tackle inflation only through 
monetary policy. In addition to that, the economist and prominent member of the 
opposition party in Luanda claims that only those who are close to the ruling party or 
who have political connections can have access to credit in Angola.
299
 Therefore, the 
government of Angola should make great efforts to render access to credit more 
transparent and simpler.  Related to this point, many Angolans complain over the 
difficulties of opening businesses in the country. Due to privileges which members of the 
ruling party and their relatives enjoy, many Angolans cannot easily open businesses.
300
 
For instance, in 2006 Angola was ranked the least competitive economy out of 125 
economies by the World Economic Forum.
301
 Thus, the government of Angola should 
promote a more friendly business environment by facilitating the delivery of licenses. I 
will deal with these two issues further in the last chapter. 
 
3.4.2 In the medium and long term 
3.4.2.1 The Agriculture sector. 
China represents a real and huge opportunity for many African countries.  
 China has a population of more than one billion people with a growing middle class, 
whose purchasing power is constantly increasing and also has a growing appetite for 
imported products.
302
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China‟s imports as a percentage of GDP are more than 25%, compared with 15%, 14% 
and 11% respectively for the United States, the European Union and Japan.
303
 
  
In the meantime, Chinese agriculture is increasingly struggling to feed the whole Chinese 
population not only as a result of higher spending and increasing population but also of 
worsening water shortages.
304
 According to the World Bank forecast, China‟s net grain 
imports will rise to 19 million tones in 2010 and to 32 million tones in 2020.
305
 The 
United States Department of Agriculture has forecast that China could import as much as 
57 million tones of grain in 2020.
306
 
 
Angola has great potential in agriculture as pointed out in the beginning of this chapter. 
Since the agriculture sector employs 85% of the workforce compared to only 1% for the 
oil and diamond industries, it is therefore virtually impossible to reduce poverty in 
Angola without reviving agriculture.
307
 Besides the upgrading of a competitive 
agriculture sector that will provide food to the domestic population, Angola should 
develop an “export agriculture” that will target among others, the Chinese market. China 
represents a great opportunity for Angolan agricultural products not only because of the 
size of the Chinese market and the rising purchasing power of Chinese consumers but 
also because of other factors. 
 
First, contrary to western countries which provide huge export and production subsidies 
to their farmers, in the process distorting trade and therefore hurting the interests of 
African farmers ,  the level of subsidies provided by China to its farmers is little and 
therefore unable to distort trade to the disadvantage of African farmers. China only 
started providing subsidies to its farmers in 2004.
308
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In that same year, the country suppressed a centuries old agricultural tax policy and 
began providing subsidies to its farmers in the form of seed and machinery and the 
construction of rural infrastructure.
309
 The main objective of such a major shift in China‟s 
agriculture policy is to combat rising inequality between the cities and the rural areas by 
promoting the development of the latter. This stems from the Chinese leadership‟s fears 
that continuing poverty in rural areas may pose a threat to peace and stability.
310
However, 
as mentioned above, the amount of subsidies that China provides to its farmers remains 
limited compared to Western countries. For instance in 2004, direct subsidies to farmers 
amounted only to US$ 6.6 billion while indirect subsidies were around US$ 25 billion.
311
 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
developed countries devote around US$ 311 billion each year in subsidies to their 
farmers.
312
  Even though China is constantly increasing the amount of subsidies that it 
provides to its farmers, it is almost certain that Chinese agriculture will not be able to 
satisfy the entire population in the years to come. As a result, there will still be huge 
opportunities for Angola to export agricultural products to China.  
 
As indicated above, subsidies provided by developed countries to their farmers distort 
trade and hurt the interests of African producers. For instance,  US‟s subsidies to 
American producers of cotton is about 86% of the price of cotton, which means that for 
every dollar received by cotton producers from their sales, they receive an additional 86 
cents in subsidies.
313
 As a result, American producers of cotton are able to sell their 
products below world price and this situation certainly hurts African producers of cotton 
as they lose millions of US$.
314
 
 
Second, China also represents a great opportunity for Angolan agricultural products in 
the sense that it is easier to access the Chinese market as safety regulations are more 
relaxed compared to the European Union and the US.  
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In fact, with the deepening of globalization, the global food market has gone through 
rapid transformations in the past years, characterized by changes in demand and 
increased safety about food security.
315
 In the West, rising incomes and the consequent 
changes in life style have increased consumer demand for variety, quality and safe 
foods.
316
  Consumers in the West also attach a lot of importance on the social and 
environmental conditions of food production. However, compliance with safety 
regulations enacted by Western countries is quite expensive. For instance, it requires cold 
storage, stainless steel tables, and improvement in sanitation levels, work hygiene and 
formal certification.
317
 It is evident that compliance with such regulations is costly, 
especially bearing in mind not only the limited financial means of Angolan businessmen 
but also the lack of appropriate infrastructure in Angola. Thus, focusing on the Chinese 
market will save Angola the trouble of higher costs associated with the conformity with 
strict safety regulations imposed by Western countries.  
 
Before ending the discussion on the agriculture sector, it is worth mentioning that Angola 
should not rely on producing and importing foodstuffs in the long term. Instead, Angola 
should move downstream the chain of production by producing more added value 
products such as juice, chocolates, coffee and peanut butter.  
 
3.4.2.2 The Apparel Industry 
As revealed in the previous section, incomes are increasing in China and are very likely 
to continue doing so in the next two decades.  GDP per capita is expected to reach US$ 
1,700 in 2010 and US$ 3200 by 2020.
318
 As incomes continue to rise in China over the 
next two decades, coupled with the increase of spending on expensive items such as cars, 
computers and houses, it is quite likely that the cost of labour will also increase and at 
some points, some manufacturers in the apparel industry (as well as in other labour 
intensive industries) may expand their production “downstream” to more finished 
products such as cars, planes and computers where greater value added can be extracted.  
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Other manufacturers may delocalize their production to countries where the labour costs 
will be less than in China.
319
 Also, the limited endowment of natural resources in China 
and the increasing worldwide concerns on the environmental degradation, make it likely 
that the country will shift from the current “resource-intensive model of economic 
growth” to a more capital - intensive one in order to protect the environment.320 
 
  This situation will therefore provide Angola as well as other African countries with a 
wonderful opportunity in the apparel industry. This means Angola as well as other 
African countries could replace China as the main world producer of clothes, shoes and 
toys by supplying these items to the rest of the world. However, in order to develop the 
capabilities of producing such items, an accommodating business environment has to be 
put in place in Angola and the country has to hugely invest in education with a particular 
focus on sciences and engineering. 
 
3.4.2.3 Tourism Industry 
The tourism industry encompasses hotels and restaurants, travel agencies, tour operator 
services and tourist guide services. Its development would surely have a considerable 
positive impact on the Angolan economy.  In reality, the increasing incomes in China and 
the subsequent emergence of a Chinese middle class are enabling more Chinese to travel 
overseas as tourists. China has granted “destination status” to South Africa, Egypt, 
Morocco and recently Mauritius, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania 
and the Seychelles in a bid to encourage Chinese tourists to travel to these countries.
321
 
This pushed the number of Chinese tourists to Africa to 110 000 in 2005, compared to 
only 55 000 in 2004.
322
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Angola has got great potential in tourism. The country has 1650 Km of coastline with 
beautiful beaches that are suitable for bathers and water sports.
323
  Angola also possesses 
beautiful parks and natural reserves in the country‟s tropical forest.  
Sadly, most of Angola‟s wildlife was destroyed during the civil war but still visitors can 
view precious animals such as the rare black giant palanca (antelope).
324
 Angola should 
then take this opportunity and promote Chinese tourism in the country. Tourism from 
China will benefit Angola directly through the creation of a substantial number of jobs.  
Indirectly, it will reduce the cost of flying and make Asian markets more readily 
accessible to Angolan goods and services.  Finally, tourism will improve transportation 
and enhance the quality of infrastructure in Angola.
325
 However, in order to attract 
Chinese tourists to Angola, the construction of infrastructure such as hotels and 
restaurants as well as the renovation of natural parks will not be sufficient. More 
Angolans should also learn mandarin (the Chinese language) as well as the Chinese 
culture, especially the Chinese cuisine. Angolan authorities should also portray a good 
image of Angola in China as a good tourism destination. 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 The first part of this chapter described the structure of the Angolan economy which is 
mainly dominated by the oil and diamond industry. This is mostly the result of the long 
civil war that ravaged the country and thus, destroyed the once prosperous agriculture and 
light industry sectors. Thereafter this chapter explained the pattern of trade between 
Angola and China. Concerning the pattern, the argument was made that it is a typical 
colonial one whereby Angola exports oil to China and imports manufactured goods from 
the latter. It was argued that this pattern of trade can be better explained by considering 
the complementarities between the two economies. On one side, Angola has abundant oil 
and on the other China has abundant capital and technology. 
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This chapter then discussed the impact of trade between the two countries on the Angolan 
economy.  It was argued that the impact is generally positive as Angola generates more 
revenue by exporting oil to China and at the same time, Angolan consumers enjoy cheap 
Chinese manufactured goods. However, the chapter pointed to the fact that China is the 
bigger winner in this trade partnership as China gets oil needed to maintain its formidable 
economic growth and exports cheap manufactured goods. This chapter further indicated 
that Angola needs to perform some adjustments in order to reap more benefits in its trade 
partnership with China, both in the short, medium and long term. 
 
In the short term, Angola needs to tackle the issue of Chinese “petty traders” who are 
“invading” the country and also expand trade with China as this will benefit the majority 
of the population which has a relatively weak purchasing power. In the medium and long 
term, profitable opportunities do exist for Angola, in expanding trade in goods and 
services with China, particularly in the agriculture sector as well as in the apparel and 
tourism industries. The extent to which Angola will be able to reap these huge 
opportunities in the long term depends on the ability and visionary capacity of the 
leadership in elaborating and implementing in time the necessary policy reforms that 
would facilitate the emergence of an accommodating business sector, which will in turn 
encourage the development of a strong and competitive agriculture sector as well as 
apparel and tourism industries. 
 
Before closing this chapter, it is worth noting that trade between China and Angola is 
only one side of a coin, as we know that China has massively invested in Angola. 
Therefore, in order to have a comprehensive picture of the partnership between China and 
Angola, it is important to assess the impact of Chinese investments in Angola. Thus, the 
next chapter will cover the issue of Chinese investments in Angola. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN ANGOLA 
  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The protracted Angolan war that lasted 27 years destroyed most of the country‟s basic 
infrastructure. It left most of the roads, bridges, railways, hospitals and schools 
destroyed.
326
 The war also did not enable the country to invest in human resources as a 
result of which Angola faces a severe shortage in human resources. There are currently 
about 70 secondary schools in Angola and only one state University.
327
 Millions of 
Children do not attend school for various reasons such as inability to pay fees and poor 
water supply and sanitation.
328
 
 
After the peace accord signed in 2002, the country urgently needed to invest in the 
rehabilitation of the destroyed infrastructure as well as the construction of new ones. To 
achieve that, Angola turned to the international Monetary Fund, the World Bank as well 
as Western countries for financial assistance to execute its reconstruction program. 
However, the Breton Woods institutions predicated their financial assistance to Angola 
on the implementation of fiscal and structural reforms.
329
 The objectives of the reforms 
were to enhance transparency over the use of revenue generated by oil exports as well as 
to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Angolan economy.
330
 However, the 
Angolan government objected to the recommendations made by the IMF and the World 
Bank. Angolan Deputy Prime Minister, Jaime Aguinaldo argued that World Bank and 
IMF recommendations were politically suicidal and economically risky.
331
 For instance, 
he claimed that the IMF told the government to reduce the number of state employees in 
a bid to reduce public expenditure, thus he wondered how one could achieve that in a 
post conflict country such as Angola without creating massive unemployment.
332
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In March 2002 the IMF declared that despite years of assistance, Angola had not 
achieved significant progress in implementing fiscal and structural reforms and that it 
would be very difficult for Angola to formulate a meaningful poverty reduction 
strategy.
333
As a result of the IMF statement, the US and Britain withdrew from a donor 
conference scheduled for July 2002.
334
  
 
As Western countries and Breton Woods institutions refused to provide Angola with the 
necessary financial assistance that it needed, the country turned to other countries for 
assistance. The Angolan government sought soft loans and bilateral credit lines from 
Countries such as Brazil, India, Germany and China.
335
 So far, Chinese loans have been 
the largest, estimated at more that US$ 10 billion. China‟s EXIM Bank has played a 
leading role in the provision of Chinese loans to Angola.  Actually, China‟s EXIM Bank 
is the leading Chinese Bank in the provision of concessional loans.
336
 As a policy Bank, 
the main objective of EXIM Bank is to promote the development of the export-oriented 
economy of China.
337
 Its activities can be summarized in three categories: i) Provide 
loans for the export of Chinese products ii) Loans to Chinese companies‟ overseas 
investment and construction projects and iii) Provide concessional loans to foreign 
governments.
338
 EXIM Bank concessional loans have five basic criteria. Firstly, they 
have a maximum maturity of 20 years and are denominated in Chinese Renminbi (RMB). 
Secondly, their interest rates range from 2-4 % and are subsidized by the Chinese 
government. Thirdly, they may provide a grace period of 3-7 years to the borrower during 
which time the borrower will only repay interest and not the principal. On top of this, 
Chinese contractors must be awarded the infrastructure contract financed by the loan. 
Finally, at least 50% of the contract‟s procurement must come from China.339  
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, China‟s EXIM Bank provided Angola with a US$ 2 billion 
soft loan in 2004, managed by the Angolan minister of finance.
340
 The loan was intended 
to assist Angola with the construction of vital infrastructure, payable over 17 years with 
an interest rate of 1.5%, including a grace period of 5 years during which Angola would 
only repay the interest and not the principal.
341
 In addition, according to the terms of the 
contact, 70% of the projects financed by EXIM Bank‟s loans will have to be awarded to 
Chinese companies while the remaining 30% will go to Angolan companies.
342
 As 
indicated again in the last Chapter, this loan is tied to the payment of 10 000 barrels of 
crude oil a day by Angola to China. Since 2004, the initial US$ 2 billion loan has been 
increased several times and it is believed that the total amount of Chinese loans managed 
by the Angolan ministry of finance is around US$ 4 billion.
343
 
 
However, the largest part of the Chinese loans aimed at large construction projects are 
managed by the Gabinete para Reconstruccao Nacional (GRN), under the direction of 
General Helder Vieira Dias who is also the Minister in Chief of the Presidency.
344
 The 
loans managed by the GRN are estimated to be in excess of US$ 9 billion and were 
provided by China International Fund Ltd, a Hong Kong-based fund management 
Company.
345
 Contrary to loans provided by China‟s EXIM Bank, little is known about 
the terms of the contract signed between China International Fund Ltd and the 
government of Angola. This has prompted one Angolan economist and prominent 
member of the political opposition to argue that neither the Angolan parliament nor the 
Angolan government has sufficient information concerning the terms of the contract and 
the precise amount of Chinese loans since these are firmly controlled by the 
presidency.
346
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From what has been described above, it is evident that Chinese loans to Angola sought to 
achieve three main objectives. First of all, Chinese loans were intended to enable Chinese 
companies to penetrate the Angolan construction sector. Secondly, they were intended to 
allow China to import more oil from Angola and invest in the exploration of oil in the 
country. They also intended to stimulate the Angolan economy and increase the 
purchasing power of Angolan consumers in an attempt to increase Angola‟s imports of 
Chinese manufactured goods. Finally, Chinese loans were intended to serve as 
development assistance as they are concessional. Therefore, the Chinese came to Angola 
with a global package that contained trade, investment and development assistance.
347
 
 
That being the case, this chapter will first describe Chinese investments in Angola. Then 
it will discuss the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan economy, as well as on 
the Angolan population at large. Finally, this chapter will also provide some 
recommendations to the government of Angola, so that Angola can reap more benefits in 
the long term in its partnership with China. 
 
4.2 Description of Chinese investments in Angola  
 
Chinese investments in Angola have been massive, to the point that China has become 
the main foreign investor in Angola (see annex 3).
348
 Sinopec‟s US$ 2.4 billion 
investment in the development of a joint venture with Sonangol is the clearest example of 
Chinese considerable investments in Angola. In addition, Chinese investments have 
occurred in almost all the sectors of the Angolan economy. The economist and prominent 
member of the opposition party mentioned above argues that Chinese companies invest in 
the oil, mining, construction, media and even retail industries, although the bulk  of 
Chinese investment is located in the construction sector.
349
 An Angolan businessman 
based in the city of Benguela also concurs that Chinese investments in Angola are 
concentrated in the construction sector.
350
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4.2.1 Angolan construction sector  
Prior to the entry of Chinese companies in the Angolan construction sector, the sector 
was dominated by Brazilian companies such as Oderbrecht, Portuguese companies such 
as Texeira Duartes and Moa Engil as well as South African companies such as Murray 
and Roberts and Grinaker LTA. 
351
The arrival of Chinese construction companies in 
Angola has not pushed out of the market the well established Portuguese and Brazilian 
companies as anticipated although the latter believe that Chinese construction companies 
get unfair advantages due to the support they enjoy from the Chinese government.
352
  
In addition, since Portugal and Brazil have in the past provided Angola with loans on the 
understanding that they would be used to contract Portuguese and Brazilian construction 
companies it is very probable that the Angola government is still awarding contracts to 
Portuguese and Brazilian construction companies because it still owes money to these 
foreign based companies.
353
 In contrast to Portuguese and Brazilian companies, the entry 
of Chinese construction companies in Angola has pushed South African companies out of 
the market. This can be explained by the reluctance of South African companies to invest 
huge capital in Angola.
354
  
 
The Chinese Ministry of commerce has established a list of 35 Chinese construction 
companies that have been pre-approved to tender for contracts in Angola. According to a 
consultant, the selected companies must have a positive track record in finalizing 
contracts within the stipulated deadline and on budget, and also possess the necessary 
finances, machinery and personnel in order to successfully carry out their projects.
355
 
While Chinese companies have found it easier to establish themselves in Angola because 
of the political and to a lesser extent financial support that they enjoy from the Chinese 
government, they also face some challenges.  
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For instance, a senior employee of China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), one of 
the main Chinese construction companies established in Angola, complains that 
construction work cannot be completed as scheduled due to logistical problems 
associated with the bottleneck at Luanda‟s port as well as the prevalence of landmines in 
the interior of the country which renders the task of Chinese construction companies 
more difficult.
356
 Finally, some Chinese construction companies have faced problems 
associated with payment default on the part of the Angolan government.
357
  
 
A Chinese construction company enlarging the road that stretches from Dondo to Luanda.  
 
The main Chinese construction companies currently active in Angola include China‟s 
Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), International Fund Ltd, Chinese Overseas 
Engineering Company (COVEC), China National Electronics Import and Export Corp 
(CEIEC) and the state owned CICM.
358
 Since 2004, Chinese construction companies 
have been awarded contracts worth US$ billions. For instance, in 2004, CRBC was 
awarded a contract to build a 370 km road that stretches from Luanda to the northern 
agricultural city of Uige.
359
 The project represented an investment of more than US$ 30 
million.
360
  The project has since been completed.
361
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CRBC is also rehabilitating a portion of the 170 km road that stretches from the central 
city of Huambo to the southern city of Ondjiva.
362
 The portion that CRBC is currently 
rehabilitating stretches from Humbe ( a district of the Ombadja municipality) to Ondjiva 
and covers 92 km.
363
  Although CRBC started working in October 2007, the company has 
so far only rehabilitated  35 km.
364
 The cost of the entire project is US$ 47 million.
365
 
 
 In addition, CRBC is also building a 500 meter long bridge over the Cunene River in 
Xamgongo, Ombadja municipality.
366
 Besides CRBC, International Fund Ltd is currently 
rehabilitating two railways. The fist railway stretches from Luau (near the border with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) to the port of Lobito, in the province of Benguela. This 
1300 km railway will cost US$ 300 million.
367
  However, the rehabilitation of the “Lau-
Benguela” railway which was supposed to be completed by August 2007 is still far from 
completion due to logistical and governance factors.
368
 The second railway stretches from 
the southern city of Namibe to Menongue, the capital of Kwando Kubanco Province. 
This railway will cover 856 km and will cost approximately US$ 2 billion.
369
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A portion of the railway that stretches from Luau to Lobito rehabilitated by International fund ltd. 
 
Another project involved a consortium of Chinese companies together with Oderbrecht. It 
is the building of a new airport at Viena, 40 km north- east of Luanda.
370
 However, the 
work on the construction site has been going slower than scheduled since the Chinese 
companies building the new airport were accused by the Angolan government of illegally 
shipping minerals to China allegedly found on the construction site.
371
  
Furthermore, Chinese construction companies have built various infrastructures all over 
Angola, such as the Luanda general hospital which cost US$ 8 million, houses in Cabinda 
province, as well as water infrastructure, schools and recreational centers in various 
provinces.
372
 
Finally, China‟s state owned company CICM has recently won a US$ 28.4 billion 
contract to rebuild the electricity grid in the city of Luanda.
373
 The project seeks to 
improve and expand the capacity to supply electricity to the center and the south of 
Luanda.
374
 
 
 
 
                                                 
370
 Ibid. P25 
371
 Interview. 31 March 2008. Luanda. One Angolan told me that the mineral that the Chinese were 
shipping out of the country was indeed diamond. 
372
 Ibid. P26 
373
 The China Monitor. Burgeoning Partnerships: China, Macao and Lusophone Africa. P17 
374
 Ibid.P17 
 72 
4.2.2 Other sectors of Angola‟s economy 
 
Chinese companies have also undertaken some investments in the telecommunications 
and manufacturing sectors. ZTE Corporation International has invested US$ 400 million 
in the Angolan telecommunications sector. The money will be used for the construction 
of Angolan telecommunications network, the construction of a mobile phone factory, the 
creation of a telecommunications institute for the training of Angolan staff and finally the 
creation of a telecommunications research laboratory.
375
  
 
 China‟s Dongfeng and Japan‟s Nissan have established a car assembly plant in Viena, 
outside Luanda. Automobile CSG Angola Limited plans to assemble 30 000 vehicles a 
year, including buses, trucks and pickups.
376
 In addition, the company also plans to 
assemble motorbikes imported from China at a later stage.
377
 The company also plans to 
sell some vehicles in neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon.
378
  
 
Finally, Chinese fishing companies are also active in Angola where they have formed 
joint ventures with Angolan fishing companies and together they fish within Angolan 
waters.
379
 On top of that, Chinese businessmen have also established two fish processing 
factories in Angola. One is located in Namibe Province and the other in Porto amboim, 
Kwanza Sul Province.
380
 One half of the fish processed by the two factories is exported to 
China while the other is sold in Angola.
381
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4.3 The Impact of Chinese Investments on the Angolan Economy and on the 
population at large 
 
As Chinese companies have invested quite substantially in Angola, one will hope that 
these investments will contribute to the strengthening of economic growth as well as to 
the reduction of poverty in Angola. This can be achieved through the creation of jobs, the 
establishment of joint ventures and finally through linkages with the local economy. In 
addition, since Chinese companies are constructing roads, schools and hospitals, one 
would like to know the impact of such investments on the lives of the Angolan 
population. Therefore, this section of the chapter is going to assess the impact of Chinese 
investments on the Angolan economy as well as on the Angolan population.  
 
4.3.1Creation of jobs 
The general perception so far in this investigation concerning Chinese investments in 
Angola, is that they do create very few jobs for the Angolans, especially under Chinese 
construction companies. Most of the various actors interviewed have voiced concerns 
about the fact that Chinese companies do not hire Angolan workers. The Angolan 
businessman based in Benguela argues that 80% of workers employed by Chinese 
construction companies are Chinese.
382
 He then claims that Chinese companies bring 
with them even masons and truck drivers.
383
 In addition, one Angolan official argues that 
Chinese construction companies employ Angolans only for petty jobs. For instance, he 
claims that the Chinese use Angolan workers to transport materials.
384
 There have also 
been reports according to which some Chinese companies employ Angolan workers on a 
casual basis, instead of providing them with secure jobs.
385
 
 
While most of the respondents agree that Chinese investments in Angola barely create 
jobs for the Angolans, they differ with regard to their explication of this situation.  
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For instance, the Angolan official mentioned above argues that Chinese construction 
companies do not hire Angolan workers because of their low skills and qualification.
386
 
He also claims that language barrier is also another factor why Chinese construction 
companies are not employing Angolans, as most of the Chinese managers cannot speak 
Portuguese.
387
 The European businessman based in Huambo, mentioned above, disagrees 
with those who claim that Chinese construction companies do not employ Angolan 
workers because of their low skills. He argues that such arguments are not different from 
those that colonialists used as an excuse for not hiring natives.
388
 Thus, he firmly believes 
that if Angolan workers are not qualified then the Chinese should teach them.
389
  
The economist and prominent member of the opposition party also mentioned above, 
argues that Chinese construction companies do not hire Angolan workers not only 
because of their low skills and productivity, but also because of other factors such as their 
behavior and the inflexibility of the labour law regime.
390
 For instance, he claims that the 
degree of absenteeism is high within the Angolan workers and at the same time it is very 
difficult and costly to fire them as they are protected by rigid labour laws.
391
 As a result, 
he argues that sometimes Chinese managers pay Angolan workers and ask them to stay at 
home while they are “replaced” by Chinese workers.392 In addition, the last mentioned 
interviewee and the manager of a prominent foreign NGO argue that Chinese 
construction companies seem to work with some sense of urgency as they operate day 
and night.
393
 Therefore, they believe that some Chinese construction companies are not 
employing Angolan workers as they have to complete their tasks in a short period.
394
 
 
Contrary to the construction sector, Chinese companies involved in other sectors of the 
Angolan economy seem to employ more Angolans. This is the case with Automobile 
CSG Angola limited.  
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Two salesmen who called themselves Nino and Milton argue that last year their company 
sent 44 young Angolans to China to undergo a two month training in mechanics and that 
these young men are now working for CSG Angola limited as “middle technicians.”395 
They also claim that their company currently employs 100 Angolans although none of 
these holds a senior management position.
396
 They finally stress that their company is 
only at the first stage of operation and that in the near future they will employ more 
Angolans. 
397
 
 
It is worth noting that many respondents have criticized Chinese companies for not 
paying Angolan workers decent wages. A member of the union of professors argues that 
if Chinese construction companies do not employ Angolan workers, it is not because of 
the inflexibility of the labour law regime or of poor skills, but it is rather because Chinese 
construction companies do not pay well and therefore, he claims many Angolans do not 
want to work for the Chinese.
398
  
 
 
4.3.2 Procurement of construction materials and equipment. 
The other important issue also learnt from this investigation concerning Chinese 
investments in Angola is the fact that all construction materials come from China.
399
  
Materials such as cement, aluminum and iron ore that Chinese construction companies 
use to construct and rehabilitate the various infrastructure come from China.
400
 This is not 
only a direct consequence of the terms of the contract between Angola and Chinese banks 
that stipulates that at least 50% of the contract‟s procurement must come from China but  
is also the result of the inability of the Angolan economy to provide Chinese construction 
companies with such materials.
401
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In fact, in the preceding chapter, it was argued that the quantity of cement produced 
inside Angola is not capable of satisfying the local demand. Even in the case of 
Automobile CSG Angola limited, all the vehicle components, including tyres and glass 
come from China.
402
 Thus, if we consider the fact that almost all the procurement of 
materials and equipment comes from China, coupled with the fact that Chinese 
investments barely create jobs for Angolans, it is convincing to state that there are no 
significant backward linkages between Chinese investments and the Angolan economy. 
Thus, the benefits of Chinese investments in Angola are really reduced. 
 
4.3.3 Issue of Joint ventures (transfer of technology) 
As observed in the introduction to this chapter, according to the terms of the contract 
signed between the Angolan government and China‟s EXIM Bank, 30% of the projects 
financed by EXIM Bank concessional loans are reserved for Angolan companies.  
However, very few (if any) Angolan companies are able to participate in the realization 
of projects financed by Chinese soft loans.
403
 This situation can be explained by two 
factors. First of all, it is difficult for Angolan companies to have access to credit. As 
argued before, only those Angolans that have connections with politicians or those who 
are closer to the ruling party can have easy access to credit. The same goes for Chinese 
soft credit.
404
 Second, many Angolan companies do not possess the necessary technology 
and human capacity (skills) to participate in challenging projects financed by Chinese 
soft loans.
405
 Given this situation, it is quite difficult for Angolan companies to form joint 
ventures with Chinese companies. As a result, the absence of joint ventures between 
Angolan and Chinese companies hinders the transfer of Chinese technology to Angolan 
companies and the concomitant diffusion of skills to Angolan workers. 
  
 
 
                                                 
402
 Interview. 2 April 2008. Luanda 
403
 Interview. 25 March 2008. Huambo & Interview. February 2008. Benguela 
404
 Interview. 25 March 2008. Huambo 
405
 Ibid 
 77 
The scenario just cited above makes a manager of a development NGO wonder who will 
maintain the infrastructure that Chinese construction companies are building as there is 
no transfer of technology and diffusion of skills.
406
 As such, it is quite obvious that 
Chinese investments in Angola are not having a positive effect on the emergence of a 
strong and competitive private sector in Angola. The only sector where there is a joint 
venture between a Chinese company (Sinopec) and an Angolan company (Sonangol) is in 
the oil sector. However, the oil sector employs less than 1% of the total labour force and 
is relatively insulated from the rest of the economy.
407
 
 
Furthermore, the presence of many small Chinese construction companies in Angola 
threatens the interests of Angolan construction companies as these are not able to 
compete against the small Chinese construction companies.
408
  Exacerbating the situation 
as well is the fact that Angolan as well as foreign companies prefer to deal with small 
Chinese construction companies since these possess more skills, finances and their 
services are less expensive compared to those of Angolan construction companies.
409
 
Therefore, the presence of small Chinese construction companies deprives Angolan 
construction companies of the necessary space for growth in strength and in capacity. 
Thus, it is then fair to argue that the presence of small Chinese construction companies 
has a negative impact on the emergence of a strong private sector in Angola. 
 
4.3.4 Impact of Chinese Investments on the Angolan Population at large  
 
The general assessment regarding the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan 
population is that these investments are indeed having a positive impact on the lives of 
Angolans although in a limited way. Due to the considerable extent of destruction caused 
by the protracted civil war, the needs of the Angolan population for basic services such as 
clean water, electricity, education, health and transport are so huge that they can not be 
satisfied by Chinese investments alone.  
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Nonetheless, Chinese investments are already having a positive impact on the lives of 
many Angolans. For instance, the head of a development NGO mentioned above argues 
that Chinese investments are enabling farmers from the south to transport their products 
to Umamala.
410
 In addition, he argues that as a result of the improvement in the transport 
system (which is also due to Chinese investments), the price of construction materials 
such as cement has decreased in inner Angola.
411
 The Angolan businessman based in 
Benguela is also of the view that Chinese investments are benefiting the Angolan 
population. He is of the opinion that in a city of four million people such as Luanda, 
Chinese investments have improved the transport network as well as the delivery of clean 
water and electricity. He believes that Chinese investments have improved the standard 
of living of Angolans living in big cities such as Luanda.
412
 The executive director of a 
communitarian development NGO based in the city of Benguela is also of the view that 
Chinese investments are benefiting the Angolan population. He claims that Chinese 
construction companies are rehabilitating social infrastructures such as schools and 
hospitals that have not been maintained for 30 years.
413
 He asserts that they are doing so 
in cities such as Huambo, Benguela, and Luanda and even in the provinces with difficult 
access such as Kwanza Sul, Moxico, Kwando Kubango and the Lundas.
414
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An agricultural college built by a Chinese construction company in the city of Huambo 
 
Concerning the functionality of the infrastructure rehabilitated and built by the Chinese 
construction companies, the manager of a prominent foreign NGO mentioned above 
argues that because of extensive destruction during the war, Chinese companies started 
rehabilitating infrastructure that could be easily functional.
415
 Thus, hospitals and schools 
rehabilitated by the Chinese are operational.
416
 However, the manager of the NGO 
remarks that many of the hospitals and schools are faced with shortages of qualified 
staff.
417
 
 This tallies with the view of the CEO of an Angolan research center mentioned in 
Chapter 3, who argues that Luanda‟s general hospital built by COVEC is understaffed 
and is also too small to provide services to the entire Kilamba Kiaxi municipality.
418
 
 
Several respondents are of the opinion that the majority of Angolans still do not benefit 
from Chinese investments.  
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Actually, the head of the development NGO argues that schools constructed by Chinese 
construction companies in various cities are mostly attended by students who live in 
those cities and the same goes for hospitals.
419
 As such, he believes that Angolans living 
in rural areas are not benefiting from Chinese investments.
420
 He concludes by stating 
that Chinese investments are increasing inequality between rural and urban 
populations.
421
 However, even in the biggest cities such as Luanda, the extent of poverty 
remains very high, despite the Chinese investments.
422
 As argued above, Chinese 
investments alone can not improve the standard of living of the majority of the Angolan 
population. 
 
4.3.5 The Quality of Infrastructure renovated or built by Chinese construction companies 
 
Before closing this section, a short discussion concerning the quality of infrastructures 
built or rehabilitated by Chinese construction companies is pertinent. The majority of 
respondents argue that the various infrastructures built by Chinese construction 
companies seem good although they believe it is too soon to evaluate them as these 
infrastructures are still new.
423
 In fact, the businessman from Benguela argues that 
perhaps one should wait for five years before passing a judgment on the quality of these 
infrastructures.
424
  
 
 
Nevertheless, there are growing concerns over the quality of infrastructures built by 
Chinese construction companies since the heavy rains in early 2007 washed away many 
of the newly built Chinese roads.
425
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In addition, the fact that Angola does not possess proper structures that can supervise the 
roads that Chinese construction companies are rehabilitating is also a matter of 
concern.
426
 Fortunately, the government of Angola has recently contracted German 
consultants to supervise large sections of roads that Chinese construction companies are 
rehabilitating.
427
 This measure needs to be applauded as it will ensure that the roads 
rehabilitated by Chinese construction companies conform to acceptable standards. 
 
Still, there seems to be a serious lack of planning and coordination over the rehabilitation 
and construction of various infrastructures by Chinese construction companies. For 
instance, in Huambo, a Chinese construction company had to demolish the roads it had 
already rehabilitated in order to install electrical cables and pipe underneath.
428
 In 
addition, despite the fact that China National Electronics Import and Export Corp 
(CEIEC) began the renovation and widening of water distribution network in the city of 
Huambo in late 2005, clean water is still not running from the tap to this day although 
CEIEC has claimed to have completed its work.
429
  It has also been alleged that Chinese 
construction companies sometimes break electrical, water and even telephone cables in 
the course of their work.
430
 For instance, in the capital Luanda, a Chinese construction 
company broke electrical cables as it was rehabilitating roads. As a result, more than 50 
000 people were left without electricity in March and April 2008.
431
 In this regard, the 
economist and prominent member of the opposition party argues that in some case, 
Chinese investments create new problems for Angola, such as cholera.
432
 
On his part, the European businessman based in Huambo argues that the lack of 
coordination and the poor planning in the implementation of projects is due to the lack of 
capacity in terms of planning by the government of Angola.
433
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4.4 Lessons from Chinese Investments in Angola: The way forward 
 
From what has been argued so far in this chapter, it is clear that almost four years after 
the arrival of Chinese companies in Angola, it is possible to fairly assess the impact of 
Chinese investments on the Angolan economy as well as on the standard of living of 
Angolan citizens. As explained in the preceding section of this chapter, the impact of 
Chinese investments on the Angolan economy remains ambiguous and superficial. Also, 
the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan population is unclear. This means it is 
important for the government of Angola to take some steps aimed at correcting these 
shortcomings so that Angola can benefit from Chinese investments in the long term. 
Thus, in this section of the paper will be suggested some measures that could help Angola 
reap full benefits from Chinese investments, both in the short and long term. 
 
4.4.1 In the Short term 
 
The issue of job creation is clearly one of the most important in assessing the impact of 
any investment on an economy. The extent to which an investment creates jobs has 
positive effects on any economy as it has the potential to trigger the economy through the 
multiplier effect. The fact that Chinese investments in Angola barely create jobs for 
Angolans greatly reduces the benefits of such investments. Therefore, it is important that 
the government of Angola ensures that Chinese construction companies are indeed 
employing Angolan workers; both in management as well as in laborer positions. It is 
difficult to accept the argument advanced by some Chinese construction companies for 
not employing Angolans, which is that the latter have poor skills.  
Indeed such an argument is particularly hard to accept given the fact that Automobile 
CSG Angola limited has empowered 40 Angolans by sending them to China for a short 
training. Thus the question that arises is: why can‟t the Chinese construction companies 
do the same? 
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 The government of Angola should put in place a “quota” system that will force Chinese 
construction companies to engage a minimum percentage of Angolan workers at each 
level of responsibility.  Although it is understandable and legitimate that the Angolan 
government seeks to protect the rights of Angolan workers, it is also evident that the rigid 
regulations in the labour market open the way to abuse by workers which in turn deters 
managers from hiring more workers. For instance, workers enjoy a mandated three days 
sick leave per month and an allowance of two weeks off for mourning, which is open to 
abuse.
434
 
Thus, the Angolan government should try to loosen regulations in the labour market in 
order to empower managers to dismiss lazy and unreliable workers. 
 
Finally, while it is understandable that the Angolan government wants to see the main 
infrastructure completed as soon as possible in order to improve the standard of living of 
the Angolan population, the government should extend the duration of construction 
projects where possible so that Chinese construction companies can employ more 
Angolan workers and pass to them the necessary skills. 
 
The other important issue that the Angolan government should tackle in the short term is 
procurement of materials and equipment. Since Chinese construction companies bring 
with them all materials and equipment from China, this situation further reduces the 
benefits that Angola gets from Chinese investments. Therefore, the Angolan government 
should facilitate the emergence of a strong private sector specialized in the manufacture 
of construction materials, such as cement, aluminum and iron ore. This is important 
bearing in mind that Angola has only started its reconstruction process and will still need 
such materials for many years to come.  
The emergence of a strong construction industry will create more jobs and boost total 
output. In order to achieve this goal, the government needs to facilitate access to credit 
and create an accommodating business environment. 
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It has also been pointed out that Chinese fishery companies are also operating in Angola. 
It would be expedient for the Angolan government to limit the entry of Chinese fishery 
companies into that industry and encourage the emergence of a strong local fishery 
industry. Actually, the increasing presence of Chinese companies in the industry may 
deprive Angolan businesses entry into the industry as a result of stiff competition 
. 
Recommended as well is that the Angolan government should limit the entry and 
establishment of small scale Chinese construction companies in Angola, in order to 
preserve the necessary space needed by Angolan construction companies for their growth 
and expansion. 
 
Finally, as argued so far, the Angolan government plus all the provincial governments 
have weak capacity in terms of planning and implementing construction projects. As 
such, there is an urgent need for reform within the public sector, especially in the 
ministry of public works in order to increase the capacity of the ministry regarding 
planning and implementing projects.  
 
 
4.4.2 In the long term  
In the long term, the government of Angola should deal with the weak capacities of 
Angolan construction companies. Thus, the Angolan government will have to boost the 
overall capacities of Angolan construction companies in order to allow them to form joint 
ventures with Chinese construction companies as well as with Brazilian and Portuguese 
construction companies. As already argued in this chapter, without joint ventures 
between Angolan and Chinese construction companies, it will be virtually impossible for 
the former to acquire the technology and skills needed to undertake significant 
infrastructural projects.   
 
However, one can not entirely blame the Chinese companies for the lack of joint 
ventures, or lack of participation of Angolan companies in projects financed by Chinese 
soft loans.  
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It has been pointed out in this chapter that Angolan construction companies are unable to 
form joint ventures with Chinese construction companies or participate in projects 
financed by Chinese soft loans because of technical, financial and capacity constraints. 
That being the case, the Angolan government should invest in education, especially in the 
areas of engineering and science as well as in scientific research in order to develop 
qualified staff. Given the deficiency of the Angolan education system, coupled with the 
shortage of qualified lecturers, badly paid lecturers as well as low quality teaching, a 
serious reform of the education system is needed to achieve the objective mentioned 
above.
435
  
In addition to the education system, the government should also assure Angolan 
businesses fair access to credit, including Chinese soft loans. In the same vein, the 
government should foster a competitive climate between Angolan companies. These 
issues will be discussed further in the last chapter. 
 
Finally, it would not be a bad idea for the Angolan government to acquire in the long 
term an agency that will supervise the works of foreign construction companies instead of 
relying on the German company. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In the first part of this chapter, a description of Chinese investments in Angola was given. 
The argument was made that although Chinese investments cover almost all the sectors 
of the Angolan economy, they are concentrated in the construction sector. A brief 
description of the major works that Chinese construction companies have undertaken and 
are still undertaking was then presented.  
It was highlighted that Chinese construction companies are constructing roads, railways, 
hospitals, schools and other infrastructures all over Angola. Mention was made of some 
Chinese investments that are located in the manufacturing and services sectors. 
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The second part of this chapter made an assessment of the impact of Chinese investments 
both on the Angolan economy and on the Angolan population at large. Regarding the 
impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan economy, it was argued that Chinese 
investments are not really having the anticipated positive impact on the Angolan 
economy, at least for the moment, as Chinese investments are not creating many jobs and 
also do not have linkages with the local economy. It was asserted that as a result of the 
absence of joint ventures between Chinese construction companies and Angolan 
construction companies, there is no significant transfer of technology and diffusion of 
skills from Chinese construction companies to Angolan construction companies.  
 
Concerning the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan population, a claim was 
made that although Chinese investments have some positive impact on the Angolan 
population, these remain limited and ambiguous as Chinese investments sometimes have 
a negative impact on the population. The quality of infrastructures that are either built or 
rehabilitated by Chinese construction companies was then discussed. Here, the point was 
made that infrastructures built by Chinese construction companies appear good although 
no one knows how durable they will be. The concerns of many respondents since the 
rains of early 2007 that washed away many of the Chinese newly constructed roads were 
voiced. The government of Angola was commended for hiring a German company to 
supervise the works of Chinese construction companies.  
 
The last part of this chapter presented some suggestions to the attention of the 
government of Angolan so that both in the short and long term Angola can reap 
maximum benefit from Chinese investments. In the short term, it was recommended that 
Angola should make sure that Chinese companies hire Angolan workers by imposing a 
quota system.  
It was then suggested that the Angolan government should lessen its regulations in the 
labour market in order to stop workers from abusing the current rigid labour law regime. 
This measure will encourage more managers, including Chinese ones, to employ more 
Angolan workers.  
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Recommended as well was that the government of Angola should provide Chinese 
construction companies more time to complete their works so that in the meantime they 
could employ Angolan workers and empower them. The issue of procurement of 
materials and equipment was raised. Here, the suggestion was that the government of 
Angola should encourage the emergence of an industry specializing in the manufacturing 
of construction materials that will be sold to all construction companies operating in 
Angola, including the Chinese companies. It is sincerely hoped that such new activities 
will create many direct and indirect sustained jobs in Angola. 
 
In the long term, the suggestion was made that the government of Angola should upgrade 
the capacities of Angolan construction companies in order to allow them to form joint 
ventures with Chinese construction companies, as well as the Brazilian and Portuguese 
construction ones. This will allow Angolan construction companies to gain the necessary 
technology and skills. Finally, an assertion was made that it would be better for Angola to 
create an agency to supervise the works of foreign construction companies. 
   
Overall, the impact of Chinese investments in Angola is not very positive at the moment. 
It is essential that the Angolan government implements structural reforms aimed on one 
hand at boosting the capacity of the public sector to deliver basic services and on the 
other, at creating a friendlier business environment. Of course, in the absence of strong 
and efficient administration that can provide its citizens with a competitive education and 
foster a strong and competitive private sector, it is unlikely that even the roads, electrical 
grids and railways built by the Chinese (even if they are of sufficient quality) will have a 
positive effect on the development of the country.  
Also, the issue of maintenance of these infrastructure will be problematic as there would 
be no local company capable of maintaining them. We will deal with the issue of 
structural reforms more closely in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a result of China‟s consistent rise as a world power and its growing role in Angolan 
political economy, China is now perceived by Angola as a credible alternative to the 
West. The fact that China does not attach its financial assistance to African countries to 
conditions related to human rights, good governance and democracy has been widely 
appreciated in Luanda. For instance, during the recent visit of French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy to Luanda, Angolan foreign minister Joao Miranda argued that Angola prefers to 
deal with China as the middle kingdom does not impose stringent conditions on its loans 
and grants to African countries.
436
 As mentioned before, Chinese banks have given huge 
amounts in loans to the Angolan government without any conditions on political and 
economic governance. As pointed out earlier, Chinese “unconditional loans” were 
provided to Angola at a time when Western governments as well as the Breton Wood 
institutions predicated their financial assistance to Angola on the implementation of 
structural and fiscal reforms. As expected, Western academics, journalists and politicians 
have voiced concerns over the impact of China‟s engagement in Angola on the political 
and economic governance of the country. These same commentators have also voiced 
concerns that African countries may find themselves in an unequal relationship with 
China whereby they export raw materials to China and import manufactured goods from 
that country. 
  
Although the concerns just mentioned are legitimate, one does not need to be too 
pessimistic and ignore some of the positive impact of the new partnership between China 
and Angola on the Angolan economy as well as on the Angolan population as a whole.  
In heading towards the end, the general conclusion of this study is that the partnership 
between China and Angola is neither positive nor negative. This study is of the view that 
there are both positive and negative aspects in the current partnership between China and 
Angola.  
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The future of this partnership will depend on the ability of the Angolan government not 
only to correct the mistakes made so far but also to envisage a new form of partnership in 
the future which will allow Angola to reap the most benefits it can. This study is of the 
view that without such a visionary plan, Angola will surely lose in its partnership with 
China in the long term. 
 
Thus, having said that, this chapter will have three sections. The first section will recap 
on the main findings that this study has uncovered regarding trade between China and 
Angola and Chinese investments in Angola. The second section will deal in detail with 
the issue of structural and fiscal reforms. Finally, the last section of this chapter will 
provide some leads for future research and also draw some lessons that other African 
countries may learn from the Angolan case. 
 
5.2 OUTCOMES OF TRADE BETWEEN CHINA AND ANGOLA AND OF 
CHINESE INVESMENTS IN ANGOLA 
5.2.1 Issue of  Trade between China and Angola 
As far as trade between China and Angola is concerned, this study has showed that trade 
between the two countries is mostly driven by the complementarities of the two 
economies as Angola possesses huge reserves of natural resources while China possesses 
technology and huge capital. Also, this study has asserted that although China is the 
biggest winner in the trade between the two countries, this reality does not imply that 
Angola does not benefit from trading with China. In fact, Angola does benefit in trading 
with China in many ways. 
  
First of all, this study has demonstrated that the rise of China‟s imports of Angolan oil in 
the context of high crude oil prices partially fuelled by strong Chinese demand, has 
enabled the government of Angola to significantly increase its revenue. The surge in 
Angola‟s national revenue has enabled the government of Angola to eliminate fiscal 
deficit and also to lower inflation as well as to stabilize the exchange rate.   
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Although one cannot entirely attribute to China‟s huge imports of Angolan crude oil the 
success achieved by  Angola in the management of its macroeconomic policies, it is 
evident that China‟s voracious appetite for oil has helped Angola achieve in a few years 
what the IMF has been unable to achieve in many years.  
 
Second, this study has also shown that trade between Angola and China is benefiting 
Angolan consumers as they can easily afford cheap Chinese manufactured goods. Trade 
between the two countries also benefits the Angolan economy as it enables Angola to 
import from China cheap construction materials needed for Angola‟s reconstruction. 
Nevertheless, this study has also noticed that Angolan import of Chinese manufactured 
goods is still limited and that Angola imports more expensive Chinese manufactured 
goods from middle trades men in South Africa, Dubai and Europe.  
 
This study has also criticized the fact that Chinese petty traders are allowed to operate 
freely in Angola. This situation is damaging for Angolan traders as the more influential 
Chinese petty traders pose a debilitating direct competition to Angolan traders. This 
situation could well lead to violence in future.  
 
5.2.2 Chinese Investments in Angola 
  
As far as Chinese investments in Angola are concerned, this study has shown that for the 
moment, the positive impact anticipated from Chinese investments on the Angolan 
economy has not been realized. However, concerning the impact of Chinese investments 
on the Angolan population at large, this study has demonstrated that while Chinese 
investments have some positive impacts on the Angolan population, these impacts remain 
largely dubious and limited. 
 
The impact of Chinese investments in the Angolan economy has been quite deceiving as 
this study has shown in the preceding Chapter. For instance, it has been demonstrated that 
Chinese companies, especially the construction companies currently involved in Angola, 
barely employ local workers.  
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The fact that the majority of Chinese companies in Angola are involved in the 
construction sector makes it fair to argue that overall, Chinese investments in Angola do 
create a few jobs. This study has come to the conclusion that the fact that Chinese 
investments in Angola barely create jobs for the locals limits the benefits of such 
investments for the local economy. Nevertheless, this study has also found that Chinese 
companies are not the only ones to blame for the non employment of local workers. 
While it is true that some Chinese companies are keen to employ Chinese workers in a 
bid to curb unemployment in China, it is also true that Angolan workers are not employed 
for reasons such as low productivity, bad behaviour, inflexibility of the labour regime and 
time constraints. 
 
This study has also found that Chinese investments in Angola have little, if any linkages 
with the local economy. This reality applies to all sectors of the Angolan economy. In 
fact, Chinese construction companies bring with them all construction materials from 
China. The same goes for Chinese companies involved in other sectors of the economy.  
This situation is a result of the inability of the Angolan economy to provide Chinese 
companies with the necessary materials rather than calculated actions of Chinese 
managers. Therefore, since Chinese investments create relatively few jobs and also since 
all procurement of materials and equipment comes from China, the study has concluded 
that it is fair to argue that there are no significant backward linkages between Chinese 
investments and the Angolan economy. 
 
Furthermore, this study has also demonstrated that there are barely any joint ventures 
between Chinese companies and Angolan companies. The only exception to this reality is 
in the Angolan oil industry. As the result of the absence of joint ventures between 
Angolan companies and Chinese ones, this study has concluded that the transfer of 
technology from Chinese companies to Angolan companies remains illusionary. Also, the 
lack of joint ventures between Angolan and Chinese companies limits the extent of 
diffusion of skills towards Angolan workers. However, this study has argued that Chinese 
companies are not to blame for the lack of joint ventures between Angolan and Chinese 
companies. 
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 This study has argued instead that there are basically two main reasons to explain the 
lack of joint ventures. The first reason is linked to the absence of a business friendly 
environment that can among other things, facilitate companies‟ access to credit. Currently 
in Angola, access to credit is restricted not only by high interest rates but also by political 
factors. The second reason is the deficiency of knowledge and skills since many Angolan 
companies (especially construction companies) do not possess the technology and human 
capacity (skills) necessary to participate in construction projects. 
Thus, this study has concluded that as a result of the absence of joint ventures between 
Chinese and Angolan companies, Chinese investments in Angola are not having the 
intended impact of fostering a strong and competitive Angolan private sector.  
 
Concerning the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan population at large, this 
study has asserted that Chinese investments in the rehabilitation of social infrastructure 
such as schools, hospitals and recreational centers as well as the rehabilitation of roads 
and railways have improved the standard of living of sections of the Angolan population 
living in big cities, such as Luanda, Huambo and Benguela. However, the majority of 
Angolans still live in abject poverty, even in the cities.  Moreover, Chinese investments 
seem to accentuate inequalities between Angolans living in the cities and those living in 
the rural areas.   
 
This study has also demonstrated that sometimes Chinese investments create more 
problems than they bring solutions as a result of poor planning. This is the case with 
Chinese construction companies that break water, telephone, and electrical cables while 
rehabilitating roads. Also noted by this study is that the outcomes of some construction 
works done by Chinese construction companies are unsatisfactory. Furthermore, this 
study has stressed concerns over the slow pace of some construction work currently 
undertaken by Chinese companies. One could understand if the dragging pace of such 
work was due to logistical and technical reasons. However, the worrisome factor is the 
fact that there have been some allegations of corruption and mismanagement. 
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Finally, this study has stressed some concern over the quality of infrastructures 
rehabilitated or built by Chinese construction companies. Although most of the 
infrastructures built by Chinese construction companies seem to be of sufficient quality, 
it is very difficult to assess their durability, especially given the fact that the rains of early 
2007 washed away most of the new roads built by Chinese construction companies. 
However, given the fact that even the quality of roads built by Portuguese and Brazilian 
companies seems disputable, this study has stressed the need for the government of 
Angola to enforce control of the quality of the infrastructures built by the various 
companies established in Angola. Therefore, in light of all that has been mentioned, this 
study has concluded that the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan population 
remains limited and in some cases ambiguous. 
 
5.3 STRUCTURAL AND FISCAL REFORMS: THE NECESSARY PASSAGE. 
 
In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that after the end of the Angolan civil war, 
Angola refused to comply with the IMF and Western countries‟ concerns regarding 
structural and fiscal reforms. However, in the last two chapters, this study stressed the 
importance of structural and fiscal reforms for Angola. This study strongly believes that 
Angola needs to implement structural and fiscal reforms in order to foster the emergence 
of an accommodating business environment that will encourage Angolan and foreign 
investors to operate efficiently in the country. Such an environment will also allow 
Angola to diversify its economy and enable Angolan companies to effectively participate 
in global supply chains. Moreover, this study also firmly believes that the reform of the 
education sector is of extreme importance as it will allow Angola to resolve the shortage 
of skills and therefore, enable Angolan workers to increase their productivity while 
Angolan companies can move downstream the chain of production.  
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5.3.1 STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
Structural reforms are changes aimed at improving the productivity and efficiency of the 
economy.  
In other words, the objective of structural reforms is to foster the emergence of an 
accommodating business environment conducive to sustainable and strong economic 
growth. The World Bank has recently conducted a survey on the business environment in 
Angola called enterprise survey, which covered small, medium and large companies.
437
 
The survey was applied to a variety of sectors of the economy such as the manufacturing, 
services, transport and construction.
438
 According to this survey, the main obstacles to 
investment and doing business as identified by Angolan companies are electricity 
(shortage and reliability), access to financing (availability and cost), corruption and 
transportation (see annex 3) . Actually, 35%, 12.9%, 12%, 7.8%, 7.1%, 6.4% of the 
companies surveyed have identified electricity; corruption, access to financing, 
transportation, anti-competitive behaviour and informal practices, crime, theft and 
disorder respectively as the main constraints to investment and doing business in 
Angola.
439
  
 
5.3.1.1 Infrastructure 
The shortage of appropriate infrastructures in Angola, particularly electricity and 
transport is a serious constraint to the development of a strong Angolan private sector. 
However, considering the fact that the government of Angola with the backing of 
Chinese banks has devoted huge amounts of financial resources to the construction of 
hydroelectric dams, power lines as well as roads and railways, one would expect the 
overall state of infrastructures to considerably improve in the next couple of years in 
Angola. Actually, it is expected that electricity generation will grow by around 42% in 
Angola between 2007 and 2008.
440
 Thus, the government of Angola needs to continue 
investing in infrastructures, rural areas included.  
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Still, there are concerns over the maintenance of these infrastructures as Angola does not 
yet possess the capacity to maintain them.  
 
Thus, the government of Angola should put in place an agency controlled by the ministry 
of public works that will be responsible for maintaining infrastructures. Another 
alternative would be to privatize national roads so that they can be maintained by private 
companies. This seems to be a more feasible option given the shortage of skills within the 
Angolan public sector. 
 
5.3.1.2 Public Administration 
The other main factor that thwarts the development of a strong private sector in Angola is 
the weakness of the Angolan public administration. It is well known that an efficient and 
transparent public administration plays a vital role in the establishment of a conducive 
business environment. For instance, an efficient and transparent public administration 
facilitates the tasks of entrepreneurs to obtain business licenses and to register their 
businesses. With such public administration, entrepreneurs are insulated from bribes and 
rent seeking from government officials and as such their operational costs are lowered. In 
addition, an efficient public sector stimulates private initiatives as it provides 
entrepreneurs with basic services such as electricity, paved roads, telephones, and assure 
the maintenance of such infrastructures over time. 
 
As mentioned above, Angolan public administration is still weak. For instance, according 
to a survey conducted by the World Bank in 2008 which ranked 178 countries according 
to various variables related to the business environment, Angola ranked 173, 136 and 166 
respectively for starting a business, dealing with licenses and registering property.
441
 As 
mentioned above, corruption is also a serious issue in Angola. A European businessman 
based in Huambo complains that businessmen who travel with their goods from Huambo 
to Luanda have to pay bribes to policemen at various police posts. He claims that such 
behaviour is harming the interests of businessmen.
442
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This study also voiced concerns over the present inability of the Angolan public sector to 
maintain the various infrastructures that are being rehabilitated or built.  
In light of all that has just been mentioned, the government of Angola should initiate the 
reform of the public administration in order to increase its efficiency and curb the level of 
corruption within the public administration. It is obvious that the government of Angola 
will have to reduce the number of civil servants, increase salaries and hire new and better 
educated civil servants. In addition, the government of Angola should  facilitate the 
procedure of registering new businesses and the delivery of licenses by removing 
unnecessary regulations. The unfair privilege of entry into new promising businesses, 
reserved for a few Angolans, should be avoided.   
 
 Nevertheless, mobilizing financial resources, enacting new regulations and hiring 
competent workers will not by itself improve the efficiency of the Angolan public 
administration without an institutional framework based on accountability. Since any 
public administration is a complex institution that regroups politicians and policy makers, 
organizational providers (ministry, department, and agency) and front lines providers 
(teachers, doctors, policemen and engineers), it is crucial that all these actors be linked by 
a relationship of accountability. By accountability is meant a situation whereby 
politicians and policy makers provide resources and delegate powers and responsibility 
for collective objectives to the providers. Afterwards, the same policy makers generate 
information about the performance of the providers and decide to reward or punish them 
according to their actions and output. 
 
5.3.1.3 Access to Financing 
An easy access to financing (credit) is very important for an economy as it allows private 
companies to meet short-term payments for labour and supplies as well as long term 
investments. Thus, an easy access to finance leads to more investments, more 
employment and to stronger economic growth. In Chapter 3, it was mentioned that 
interest rates are high in Angola to the point that they limit private companies‟ access to 
financing.  
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It was also revealed that access to financing is sometimes reserved for individuals close 
to the ruling party or having connections with politicians. The enterprise survey of the 
World Bank also confirmed the fact that access to financing in Angola is costly and 
limited.  
Data from Angola also confirm these facts. Although lending rates have decreased from 
100% in 2003 to 19% in 2006, they are still high compared to other African countries.
443
 
In addition to that, it is difficult for borrowers to offer collateral as a result of  weak 
access to credit histories and unclear land titles.
444
 Therefore, Banks prefer to make their 
profits from transactions, short-term trade financing and investments in high interest 
government bonds.
445
 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, high interest rates in Angola are a direct consequence of the 
anti-inflationary policy adopted by the government of Angola which consists of 
combating inflation only through monetary policy. Relying on monetary policy to combat 
inflation means that interest rates have to be set high in order to limit consumption and 
investment. 
 
Indeed, one needs to realize that the double digit inflation in Angola is not only a 
monetary phenomenon but also a phenomenon caused by high supply costs. In fact, a 
closer look at the structure of Angolan inflation reveals that the prices of basic food 
commodities which are consumed by the majority of the Angolan population are above 
the average level of inflation.
446
 For instance, in November 2007, the average level of 
inflation was 1.06% while dry fish contributed to the inflation by 4.70%, cassava meal by 
4.10%, local rice by 3.46%, lamb by 3.45%, maize meal by 3.31%, first quality meat by 
2.99%, soya cooking oil by 2.99%, normal rice by 2.83%, fresh fish by 2.60% and frozen 
chicken by 2.40%. 
447
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Given the fact that the source of the double digit inflation in Angola mainly lies in the 
high cost of the main food commodities, the government of Angola should then strive to 
increase the supply of these food commodities. This can be achieved through the 
improvement of the transport and electricity infrastructures, the provision of credit to 
farmers as well as through the gradual increase of farmers‟ productivity.  
This new strategy in fighting inflation will enable the Angolan authorities to loosen up 
interest rates, thus, more entrepreneurs can have access to credit. In addition, the use of 
this strategy to fight inflation will also enable the Angolan authorities to lower the value 
of the local currency, the kwanza, which in turn will increase the international 
competitiveness of Angolan producers. 
 
Furthermore, the government of Angola should conduct an agrarian reform in order to 
establish clear land rights. The problem of land ownership in Angola started during the 
colonial era with the massive removal of Angolan peasants from their lands by 
Portuguese colonialists.
448
 It was later accentuated by the struggle for independence in 
the 1960‟s and the subsequent civil war that commenced in 1975 which forced many 
Angolans  to abandon their lands and move either to Luanda or to neighboring countries 
in order to save their lives.
449
 In 1992, the government of Angola introduced an agrarian 
reform that allowed private ownership of land. However, the government arbitrarily 
awarded pieces of land to powerful economic interests without taking into account the 
interests of Angolans who abandoned their lands during the struggle for independence as 
well as during the civil war.
450
 
 
Since the end of the civil war, many internally displaced Angolans, former combatants as 
well as former refugees returning from neighboring countries have been claiming back 
the land that they abandoned.
451
As a result, there have been competing claims of land 
rights amongst these various actors which may fuel new tensions.  
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It is therefore important for the government of Angola to resolve the conflict over the 
ownership of land in Angola not only by resolving conflicting claims of land ownership 
but also through the elaboration of laws that strongly protect the property rights of all 
land owners, including the poor. The establishment of new land rights will enable some 
Angolans to use their land as collateral when soliciting credit from commercial banks. 
 
Finally, the government of Angola should revise the structure of the lending rates in order 
to make sure that they are based on realistic risk assessment and that they do not 
extrapolate commercial banks‟ profits. The government of Angola should also make sure 
that access to financing is not restricted to members of the ruling party or to those who 
have connections with politicians. In order to achieve that, the ministry of finance can set 
an agency responsible for overseeing the operations of commercial banks, especially the 
provision of loans. Obviously, in order to be successful, such an agency would have to 
work closely with private companies. 
 
 
5.3.1.4 Justice 
This chapter has already mentioned the necessity to protect property rights. However, one 
can not achieve that without the existence of an independent and professional judiciary 
that is able to enforce property rights and to fairly resolve commercial disputes. Many 
Angolan companies do not believe in the impartiality and professionalism of the 
judiciary.
452
  Apart from that, legal fees are high and many companies avoid taking 
disputes to courts.
453
 Thus, the government of Angola needs to reform the judiciary as 
well. In order to achieve that, parliament should pass bills that will ensure that judges are 
insulated from political pressures and enjoy financial security. The courts, including 
commercial courts have to be well equipped to be effective. The members of the 
economic and judicial polices also have to be well trained and paid. 
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5.3.1.5 Competition 
It is a well known fact that the Angolan economy is one of the least competitive 
economies in the world. Actually, Angolan state owned companies have usually enjoyed 
privileges denied private and foreign companies. For instance, state owned companies 
such as Indiana and Sonangol do not always pay their taxes and also are able to escape 
the bureaucratic maneuvers that private and foreign companies have to face.
454
 In 
addition to that, the government of Angola has not yet completed the elaboration of the 
competition bill.
455
  Therefore, the government of Angola should expediently draft a 
competition bill and pass it to parliament for ratification. The competition bill should 
include a price scheme that takes into account market conditions such as production and 
distribution costs in order to prevent the formation of oligopoly markets.  On top of that, 
the same government should make sure that all companies, whether private or public 
receive the same treatment.  
 
5.3.2 FISCAL REFORMS 
 
Fiscal policy merely refers to government policy that attempts to influence the direction 
of the economy through changes in government taxes or government expenditure. Thus, 
the two instruments of fiscal policy are government expenditure and taxation. From this 
brief definition of fiscal policy, it is evident that government expenditure can influence 
positively or negatively the economic situation of a country. In fact, an expansionary 
fiscal policy (i.e. increase in government expenditure or a cut in taxes) usually leads to 
inflation in the medium to long term and to the crowd out of private investments, which 
in turn reduces total output.  
 
After the end of the Angolan civil war, the government of Angola‟s expenditure was not 
only murky but also excessive.  
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In fact, the government of Angola was not able to account for the use of US$ 4 billion 
generated from the production and export of crude oil and was also running budgetary 
deficits.
456
  
 
 In fact, Table 2 below indicates that 15.4% of government expenditure engaged between 
1997 and 2002 could not be accounted by the government of Angola. 
 
Table 2: Angolan Government‟s Unexplained Expenditures Discrepancies 1997-2002. 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL 
Total 
Government 
Expenditure                 
(US$ millions) 4,966 2,771 5,016 5,387 4,383 5,370 27,893 
Discrepancy             
(US$ millions) 1,775 34 1,119 407 540 347 4,222 
Discrepancy              
(% Government             
Expenditures) 35.7 1.23 22.3 7.56 12.3 6.46       15.4 
Discrepancy                 
(% GDP) 23.1 0.6 18.4 4.6 5.7 3.1  
Source: Human Right Watch 2006. 
 
However, as indicated in the previous chapter, the government of Angola refused to work 
under the supervision of the IMF in order to reduce expenditure (reduce fuel, water and 
electricity subsidies as well as the size of the public sector)  as well as render more 
transparent the management of oil revenue.  
 
Still, Angola managed to achieve significant progress without the help of the IMF. The 
government of Angola managed to eliminate fiscal deficits thanks to rising oil prices 
coupled with the rise of the local oil production. The Angolan government has also 
managed to reduce the level of fuel and electricity subsidies.
457
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The same government has also achieved some progress in the area of transparency over 
the management of oil revenue.
458
 Indeed, the government of Angola has started 
publishing details of oil payments on the ministry of finance website.
459
 It has also 
authorized the audit of the oil sector using acceptable accounting rules.
460
  
 
Moreover, the government of Angola has signed a contract with Aberdeen University 
Petroleum Economic Consultancy (AUPEC) to implement an oil revenue forecasting 
model and to advise the Angolan revenue services (DNI) on consolidating its capacity 
with regard to oil taxation.
461
  
 
The government of Angola is still unable to entirely account for the spending of oil 
revenue.
462
 On top of that, little is known about the terms of contracts signed between the 
government of Angola and foreign oil companies. The lack of transparency over the use 
of oil revenue mostly originates from the para-fiscal activities of Sonangol. The fact that 
Sonangol performs some of the budgetary prerogatives of the government of Angola (i.e. 
the provision of fuel subsidies to local companies, expenditure on behalf of the ministry 
of foreign affairs and payments for contracts on behalf of certain companies) hampers the 
transparence over the use of oil revenue and leads to more confusion.   As such, the 
government of Angola should continue improving the transparency over the management 
of oil revenue.  
In particular, the government should continue the implementation of the ongoing reform 
which aims to put an end to the Para-fiscal activities of Sonangol. The government of 
Angola should also separate the role of Sonangol as the concessionaire of the oil sector 
and an operator of the same sector as this multiple role gives rise to conflict of interests. 
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In addition to the shortcomings above, the government of Angola‟s fiscal policy is not 
really aligned with the priorities of poverty reduction as insufficient portions of the 
national budget are allocated to key social sectors.
463
 It can be observed from Table 3 
below that the portions of GDP allocated to education and health have been globally 
decreasing over the years despite the fact that the country is enjoying an unprecedented 
robust economic growth. It is also worth noting that the portion of the GDP allocated to 
general public services has been decreasing since 2006 as a result of the lack of capacity 
on the part of the public administration to execute programs.  As such, the government of 
Angola should align its fiscal policy actions with the priorities of poverty reduction.  
This can be done by allocating more resources to the social sectors (health and education) 
as well as by increasing the capacity of the concerned ministries in the execution of 
programs. 
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Table 3. Angola: Functional Distribution of Government Expenditures, 2002-2006. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
                         ( Billions of Kwanzas) 
General public services and other economic 
affairs 78.1 67.7 62.3 222.6 218.5 
Defense and internal security 35.4 29.5 28.6 208.9 277.6 
Education 14.0 31.1 37.4 55.6 85.5 
Health 9.3 24.2 29.6 38.2 69.5 
Social security, welfare and housing 13.4 45.3 53.0 153.5 258.0 
Energy, agriculture, mining and transportation 12.1 103.8 112.4 62.1 207.3 
Interest payments ( committed) 4.9 18.7 35.8 143.7 314.0 
Unclassified 68.0 141.2 276.6 0.0 0.0 
      
Total 235.5 461.5 635.7 884.6 1,430.40 
                        ( percent of GDP) 
General public services and other economic 
affairs 16.5 6.5 3.8 8.3 6.0 
Defense and internal security 7.5 2.8 1.7 7.8 7.6 
Education 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.4 
Health 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.9 
Social security, welfare and housing 2.8 4.4 3.2 5.7 7.1 
Energy, agriculture, mining and transportation 2.6 10.0 6.8 2.3 5.7 
Interest payments ( committed) 1.0 1.8 2.2 5.4 8.7 
Unclassified 14.4 13.6 16.7 0.0 0.0 
      
Total 49.9 44.3 38.4 33.1 39.4 
Source : Angolan authorities and IMF estimates. 
 
Although the government of Angola has managed to eliminate fiscal deficits as 
mentioned above, the non-oil fiscal balance is still in large deficit. In fact, the non-oil 
fiscal deficit as a share of non oil GDP was 61.5% and 50.8% in 2005 and 2006 
respectively.
464
  
This high non-oil fiscal deficit poses some concerns due to the unpredictability of oil 
prices. That being the case, the government of Angola should maintain the conservative 
oil price rule in the budget in order to reduce the non-oil fiscal deficit.  
                                                 
464
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The government of Angola should also operate according to a medium term economic 
framework by linking the level of public expenditure to the medium term price of oil. 
This strategy will allow it to be insulated from a world recession associated with a drop in 
the prices of crude oil. Finally, the government of Angola should not push public 
spending beyond the capacity of the public administration as this will lead to resources 
being wasted. This also means that the government of Angola should not contract further 
foreign loans as long as the capacity of the Angolan public administration of executing 
projects remains limited. 
 
It is evident that structural and fiscal reforms will pave way for an accommodating 
business environment in Angola that will enable Angolan private companies to prosper 
and diversify the economy. Such an environment will also enable Angolan companies to 
form joint ventures with Chinese and other foreign companies. However, an 
accommodating business environment alone is not enough to help the economy strive and 
expand without the presence of a well trained labour force. In fact, education is of  prime 
importance as it provides the necessary skills and knowledge that enable companies to 
innovate and increase productivity.  A more productive private sector will in turn, expand 
employment which will improve the citizens‟ standard of living. 
  
The problem with Angola is that it faces a severe shortage of skilled workers and its 
education system is in disarray. Nonetheless, the government of Angola has achieved 
some progress in the reform of the education system in the last couple of years. For 
instance, the government has gazetted compulsory primary school education for six 
years.
465
 Also, the government has updated the curriculum and teaching methods and also 
the pupil/teacher ratio has been set at 35.
466
 However, in practice things do not seem that 
rosy.  
In fact, thousands of children still do not attend school mostly for economic reasons. It is 
estimated that only 22% of Angolan children enter primary school at the age of six.
467
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Worsening the situation is that thousands of children still study in the open and teachers 
are not only badly paid but also under trained.
468
 As if that is not enough, there seems to 
be a lack of a coherent and unique education system throughout Angola and as a result 
the quality of education remains very poor in the country.
469
 
 
In tackling education related problems, the government of Angola should urgently revise 
and unify the education system by making sure that it conforms to international 
standards. In doing so, the government of Angola should particularly promote the 
learning of sciences, mathematics and technical disciplines that incorporate such skills as 
will be needed in the market place. The government of Angola should also mobilize more 
financial resources in order to increase the number of teachers and lecturers as well as to 
train them and provide them with decent wages and salaries. It is very sad that some 
Angolan children study in open air. Therefore, the government of Angola should build 
more schools for the thousands of Children who study in the open air. Finally, public 
schools operating in poor communities should provide pupils with food, medicine and 
clothes in order to persuade parents to allow their children to attend school. 
 
In Chapter 3, this study underlined the importance for the government of Angola to 
promote the development of the agriculture, light industry (apparel) and tourism 
industries as these industries have great potential for becoming the engine of future 
economic growth in Angola. It is important for the government of Angola to diversify the 
economy of the country in the medium and long term by focusing on such industries. 
Failure to diversify the economy will lead to an insignificant economic growth in the 
future since production of oil is expected to stagnate and decrease in the medium to the 
long term.  
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Therefore, the prospect of Angola gaining meaningfully in its partnership with China in 
the long term will mainly depend on the ability of the Angolan government to diversify 
the Angolan economy and move downstream the chain of production (i.e. produce more 
added value goods).  
The achievement of such objectives will enable Angolan companies to enter global 
markets and provide the Chinese markets as well as others with foodstuffs, clothes, shoes, 
as well as precious services such as tourism. In order to become such a main player in the 
global economy, Angola will have to implement structural and fiscal reforms. 
 
5.4 WHAT NEXT? AND WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR OTHER AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES? 
 
5.4.1 Questions for further study 
The focus of this study has been the impact of trade between China and Angola as well as 
the impact of Chinese investments on the Angolan economy and on the Angolan 
population. Thus, this study has concentrated on Chinese investments in Angola and trade 
between the two countries. However, the new partnership between China and Angola is 
large as it encompasses many aspects – political, economic and humanitarian as well as 
strategic. Therefore, it is clear that this study has only provided new information on an 
aspect of the partnership between China and Africa, namely the economic aspect. Thus, 
in order to have an overall understanding of the new partnership between China and 
Africa, more research will have to be conducted. In particular, it will be interesting to 
assess the impact of China‟s involvement in Angola on the political governance of 
Angola, mainly for two reasons. The first reason is because of the opacity that surrounds 
Chinese loans awarded to Angola since so little is known about the details and the figures 
of Chinese loans awarded to Angola.  
 
The second reason is the suspected personal networks that link managers of Chinese 
companies and Angolan authorities. Therefore, there is a need to investigate personal 
networks between Chinese and Angolan officials. In fact, Chinese managers and Angolan 
authorities have been suspected of entertaining corrupt relationships.  
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For instance, CRBC has claimed that funds for the Lobito railway have dried up 
mysteriously while the Angolan government has argued that CRBC has stopped working 
because of landmines along the route. It is very possible that the disputes between the 
CRBC and Angolan authorities may be on the amount of kickbacks. A similar story has 
happened between Angolan authorities and a consortium of Chinese construction 
companies building the new airport at Viena, east of Luanda. The Chinese consortium 
was accused of shipping illegally to China minerals that were allegedly discovered on the 
construction site. Since the accusations, the work progress has been very slow. It is also 
probable that the true issue disputed between the Chinese consortium and Angolan 
authorities are kickbacks. 
 
5.4.2 Lessons for other African Countries  
Finally, before closing this chapter, it is important to say that African countries, 
especially those vested with large natural resources such as Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, 
Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo may draw some lessons with regard to the 
partnership between China and Angola. This is particularly important for countries such 
as Nigeria, Gabon and the DRC where China is still a new player.  
 
 African countries need to be well prepared for negotiations in order to avoid the mistakes 
made by Angola. In fact, when Angola agreed to provide China with 10 000 barrels of 
crude oil a day in exchange for Chinese loans, the government of Angola did not envision 
that the price of a barrel of crude oil was going to surge. In addition, African countries 
have to make sure that before Chinese construction companies start operating in their 
respective countries, they possess a well trained labour force that can be employed by 
Chinese construction companies. On top of that, African countries have to make sure that 
once established in their respective countries, Chinese companies should employ local 
workers. They also have to make sure that their respective countries possess companies 
that can provide construction materials and equipment to Chinese construction 
companies.  
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Finally, African countries should make sure that they have good capacity in terms of 
planning and executing programs before contracting Chinese loans. Failure to achieve 
that will inevitably lead to resources being wasted. 
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Annex 1 
 
Angola's GDP by sector (2004)
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Angola's GDP by sector (2005)
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Angola's GDP by sector (2006)
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Annex 2 
 
A 
Figure 1 : Oil as percentage of Angolan‟s Exports to China ( 1995-2006) 
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B 
Figure 2: Angola‟s Top five imports from China (1996-2006) 
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Annex 3 
A map of Angola indicating Chinese involvement on reconstruction of major roads and railways. 
 
 
Source: Center for Chinese Studies. 
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Annex 4   
 
 
Source: The World Bank (enterprise survey) 
 
